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ABSTRACT 
Executive Fire Officers (EFOs) routinely face complex strategic challenges, but none are 
as multifaceted or as intractable as the expansion of the fire service’s core mission to 
embody intelligence functions.  Given the emerging public expectation that the fire 
service be a critical partner in efforts to secure the homeland, it is imperative that EFOs 
be prepared to lead their respective departments into this unchartered territory.   
Most EFOs agree that adjusting strategies is necessary to adapt to emerging 
threats of terrorism.   Moreover, this concept is widely accepted and embraced by the fire 
service in the context of its traditional core disciplines. Where philosophies diverge is 
how each envisions the fire service’s role related to intelligence sensing, collecting and 
sharing.  
While the threat of terrorism prevails, the fire service is challenged to adapt its 
practices, policies and strategic objectives if it is to maintain the highest state of 
operational readiness.  Inclusion of firefighters into the information and intelligence-
sharing framework will require a systemic transformation by both the fire service and its 
law enforcement partners.  Central to this transformation are national guidance 
documents on folding counterterrorism strategies into fire departments’ policies, 
procedures and operating guidelines.  Incorporating such guidance will enhance the 
homeland security by making EFOs better “First Preventers” and “First Responders.”  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In response to the ill-fated events of September 11, 2001—arguably the most 
horrific loss of life on American soil—the American fire service1 found itself in 
unchartered waters.  For the past 200 years, firefighters had become world renown for 
saving lives and property.  Most urban fire departments across the country respond to and 
mitigate a broad spectrum of calamities day in and day out.  Furthermore, though 
incidents of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or terrorism were rare in the pre-9/11 
world, fire service preparedness for such contingencies became pervasive since the late 
1980s.  Despite those efforts, 9/11 introduced Executive Fire Officers (EFOs) to 
unanticipated degrees and ramifications of risk and terrorism.  What started out as 
another tour of duty for firefighters in New York City and Arlington, Virginia, became 
the vanguard that put in motion a call to reevaluate the core functions of the fire service 
and question current doctrine and the status quo. 
Although America’s public safety network2 was keenly aware of the threat of 
terrorism, until 9/11 they operated under the shared belief that such events were virtually 
impossible on American soil because public safety professionals collaborated to prepare, 
prevent and respond to terrorism and crimes against humanity. This assumption was 
shattered that day and subsequently highlighted in the assessment by the 9/11 
Commission.  Specifically, the Commission sounded a strident reveille by proclaiming 
that the greatest impediment to all-source intelligence analysis was the human or 
systemic resistance to sharing information (National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States [9/11 Comission], 2004, p. 416).  With this announcement, the 
fire service joined the ranks of other public agencies, notably the intelligence community 
(IC),3 for its failure to “connect the dots.” 
Furthermore, the report lamented that “agencies uphold a ’need-to-know’ culture 
of information protection rather than promoting a ’need-to-share’ culture of integration” 
                                                 
1 The fire service includes operations undertaken by urban fire departments, fire and rescue emergency 
operations, emergency medical services, hazardous materials, fire prevention and investigation. 
2 Public safety network includes all emergency responders: fire, police, and emergency management. 
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(9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 417).  This analysis spurred the transformation of the 
traditional intelligence community and promoted the gradual integration of non-
traditional partners into the realm of the larger intelligence community. 
Shortly after 9/11, Congress and the President of the United States collaborated to 
pass Public Law 107–56, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT).  
On the heels of this new law, the federal legislative body passed the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 as a measure to formalize a means to carry out the Patriot Act and to enforce 
the newly created federal crime of domestic terrorism.  The most significant aspect of the 
Homeland Security Act was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  
According to Homeland Security Act of 2002, the mission of the DHS is:  
To prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce the 
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and minimize the damage, 
and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the 
United States. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2002)    
Once the creation of the Department of Homeland Security came to fruition, 
national strategic initiatives followed as instruments for addressing the intelligence lapse.   
Significantly, the National Strategy for Information Sharing set forth the criticality of 
collaborative efforts to counter and deter domestic terrorism by reiterating, “One clear 
lesson of September 11 was the need to improve the sharing of information” (White 
House, 2007, p. 7).  As set forth by the Strategy, gathering, analyzing and the sharing of 
information and intelligence became paramount for the prevention and deterrence of 
future terrorist acts against the homeland. The strategy called for a multi-directional flow 
of information to include state, local and tribal partners to prevent future terrorist attacks, 
counter and respond to threats (White House, 2007, p. 3).  
Among the lessons learned3 from that traumatic day were some harsh realities for 
the fire service.  Beyond the staggering number of line-of-duty deaths was the 
unimaginable use of unconventional weapons aimed at harming civilians and first 
                                                 
3 Lessons Learned refers to the best practices for emergency responders and homeland security 
officials. Access to the National Lessons Learned Information Sharing network is via the Web site: 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/index.do. 
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responders alike.  The absence of situational awareness and lack of a shared command 
structure for all responders to exchange information and intelligence served as a wake-up 
call. Moreover, this particular event underscored the criticality of a coordinated local 
response to modern terrorist attacks that would place the fire service at the forefront of 
the first responder community.  
The modern fire service is now an integral partner in the larger homeland security 
mission, requiring EFOs to maximize local or regional efforts against terrorist activities 
touching American soil. Now more than ever, EFOs must anticipate applying non-
traditional measures or action to prevent, deter, or mitigate a terrorist attack where 
possible.  With this new responsibility comes the need to navigate through uncharted 
territory for the traditional fire service, whose unifying ideology and strategic vision 
center on the core mission of protecting life and property. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
EFOs face no challenge more intractable than the expansion of their core mission 
to embody intelligence functions4 that are at once alien to firefighters and dependent on 
equally unprecedented collaborations with non-firefighter partners in public safety.  
While most EFOs accept that reformulating strategies is in order, they diverge on how 
best to move forward.  In addition to other cultural changes in information sharing by law 
enforcement, EFOs need a coherent approach to each of the following three elements for 
a successful firefighter intelligence transformation: 
B. FIRST RESPONDER TO FIRST PREVENTER—FINDING A 
MIGRATION PATH 
The current homeland security threat assessment suggesting the potential for 
terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction has raised the collective 
consciousness of most urban fire departments. While they have spent countless hours  
 
                                                 
4 Intelligence functions include parts of the intelligence process that experts define as a five-step 
process: 1) identifying requirements, 2) collection, 3) processing and exploitation, 4) analysis and 
production, and 5) dissemination (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 54). 
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preparing to respond to WMD incidents through education and training focused on 
equipment, techniques and strategies to handle such events, most efforts dealing with 
preventing terrorist attacks have been superficial at best.     
To transform the fire service from a first responder to a first preventer5 
organization, it is imperative that EFOs introduce and adopt principles of intelligence 
collection and sharing.  Then EFOs must incorporate these principles into department 
policies, procedures and strategic initiatives, if they are to maintain a state of readiness 
consistent with current threat assessments.  Neither role is exclusive to the other.  
However, by inculcating first preventer disciplines into the skill sets of major urban fire 
departments, resulting contributions to counterterrorism will be seen to pay dividends in 
firefighter safety.  Additionally, collaborative efforts between fire and law enforcement 
necessitated by intelligence needs, ultimately benefit the fire department in its larger 
mission of protecting its community.    
C. LEADERSHIP—SETTING NEW PRIORITIES FOR THE LONG TERM 
As with all organizations or industries, cultural transformation is difficult and 
seldom rapid.  Despite internal resistance and resource limitations, organizational change 
is certainly achievable given the persistence and commitment exemplified by visionary 
leaders.  Within the fire service, cultural shifts tend to be reactionary and generally in 
response to lessons learned, technological advances or legal mandates.  Given the 
paramilitary hierarchy of the fire service where the final decision maker is usually the 
chief of the department, as the discussion moves to adapting core functions or possibly 
one’s mission, EFOs are the natural starting point for change of this magnitude. 
While the modern fire service rarely exhibits radical change in its culture and day-
to-day operations, most EFOs have acknowledged that preparing for terrorist attacks is a 
business priority that is not going away. Therefore, on a national scale, institutional 
                                                 
5 First preventer refers to an active participant in the intelligence/information gathering and sharing 
arena. 
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culture6 seems to be the greatest hurdle for the fire service to comprehend the importance 
of actionable intelligence and the process of information gathering and sharing. Via 
transformational leadership, officers can institute change within their respective 
departments that should have a rippling effect that transforms the current fire service 
paradigm.   
D. OPERATIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE—CLARIFYING FIRE’S 
INTELLIGENCE ROLE 
Arguably, the fire service lacks a fundamental understanding about what 
intelligence is and is not.  Conversely, it would be difficult to identify an EFO who does 
not recognize the importance of situational awareness for mitigating incidents.  
Furthermore until the fire service acknowledges the criticality of participation in 
gathering and disemintaing information within the fire service and the necesity to engage 
in collaborative efforts with non-traditional partners, EFOs won’t recongize that their 
actions contibute to the larger homeland security mission. 
To bridge this gap, it is imperative that the leadership of the fire service defines 
what their intelligence needs are; acknowledge that intelligence gathering is a common 
phenomena with every incident and scene size-up or fire inspection; and differentiating 
that law enforcement-centric intelligence is not the same for the fire service.  Critical to 
the emergence of fire service intelligence nomenclature is a basic understanding opined 
by intelligence experts who have said that “all intelligence is information; not all 
information is intelligence” (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 2).   
                                                 
6 Institutional culture is a concept in the field of organizational studies and management which 
describes the attitudes, experiences, beliefs and values of an organization. It has been defined as “the 
specific collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization and that 
control the way they interact with each other and with stakeholders outside the organization” (Hill & Jones, 
2001). 
 6
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines the relationship between organizational culture 
and leadership theory regarding the adoption of non-traditional functions in the fire 
service. Researchers assume that if EFOs are to succeed in the transformation of the fire 
service from first responder to first preventer, they must understand emerging trends 
related to organizational theory and relevant adaptive leadership. If an intelligence role is 
necessary for becoming first preventers, and if the shift to first preventer is a strategic 
change, then EFOs need to have an idea of how to implement strategic initiatives in the 
first place.  In its culture and traditions, however, the fire service has historically 
allocated minimal time and attention to strategic initiatives in general.  Under the 
circumstances, embracing an intelligence role and first preventer responsibilities will 
mean an uphill and steep climb for most EFOs.   
Moreover, as much as terrorist attack prevention and intelligence gathering may 
be unfamiliar to firefighters, academic proponents of intelligence sharing are no doubt 
equally uneducated regarding the life-endangering and life-saving priorities that 
firefighters must assess and mitigate on a regular basis. Consequently, a theorist’s grasp 
of the firefighter’s duties and opinions of how and whether a firefighter should allocate 
time and priority to an intelligence task are likely to be deficient.  Absent an infusion of 
ground truth, such opinions will be unburdened by the realities of personal risk and legal 
liability that EFOs acquire only by experience and scar tissue.  Therefore, two streams of 
literature require review and blending to shed light on this dilemma.  One stream must 
address matters of organizational change and user acceptance of new strategic initiatives.  
The other must address intelligence collection and sharing as a new and secondary duty 
for public servants who already have a demanding, full-time job.   
The researcher discovered ample literature directed toward organizational 
behavior and leadership. Most has universal benefit to the public sector. However key to 
this research were organizational behavior related to environments that experience 
complexity and chaos with the paramilitaristic undertone similar to the fire service.  
Unlike analytical arms of intelligence agencies which may more closely resemble think 
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tanks or academic environments, fire departments face life-threatening situations with the 
kind of frequency that intrudes on quiet reflection.  In this context, firefighters see 
themselves as rescuers first and analysts second—if there is time.  Being routinely 
bombarded with life-threatening situations ultimately sustains for the fire service an 
operating tempo that may be altogether alien to most traditional intelligence functions.  
This widens the gap in comfort zones between fire and intelligence. 
Despite a wealth of academic efforts on the study of intelligence operations for 
both the military and civilian law enforcement institutions, there are exiguous documents 
that include the fire service.  Post 9/11, there has been an explosion of documents 
describing intelligence functions and information sharing for every level of government 
to support the larger public safety mission.  
Comparatively, most fire service literature is derived from trade publications, 
websites or in the form of a lessons learned communication where first hand experiences 
are shared and serve as the basis for learning.7 In these forums, the fire service evaluates 
trends and equipment or discussions about the ever subjective “tactical tool chest” as seen 
from the eyes of the author. Rarely are published or blogged writings debated with 
empirical data, but rather they are subject to a “hands-on” analysis to determine the 
efficacy or merits of the practice or procedure. Occasionally concepts dealing with fire 
service culture, such as its behaviors and attitudes, leadership, or emotional intelligence 
are viewed as “soft” issues or radical thinking and ignored completely until tragedy 
strikes.  That said, throughout this thesis, the researcher draws on over eighteen years of 
experience in a major urban fire department in referring to the undocumented traditions 
and culture of the fire service.  
A. COMPLEXITY THEORY AND LEADERSHIP 
Most traditional hierarchical perspectives of leadership commonly seen in the fire 
service appear archaic when faced with the uncertainties of the prevalent homeland 
security environment. Today’s modern fire service engages in a multitude of functions to 
                                                 
7 Several common sources are; Fire Chief, Fire Engineering, Fire House Magazine, Fire Rescue 
Magazine, Fire Rescue1.com, US Department of Homeland Security: Lessons Learned Information Sharing 
(LLIS.gov), IAFC Homeland Protection & Security Weekly, Firfighternearmiss.com. 
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meet the expectations of providing a complex service delivery, so “complexity” is not 
new to the fire service. Each incident involves several layers and chains of events to 
mitigate in its simplest form.  
Scholars and management authorities have written extensively about 
transformational leadership and complexity theory. These experts suggest that 
organizations are highly complex and nonlinear, and leadership theory must adapt to 
meet the complex needs of our modern world. One model well suited for the 
paramilitaristic fire service is commonly used by the military.  The military model’s 
strategy toward command and control is accompanied by methods of dealing with 
inherent complexity and the adoption of an effects-based approach.  
When first viewing intelligence, the fire service sees a singular, non-traditional 
action rather than focusing on the outcomes of this function.  This view neglects to 
consider how sharing raw information will contribute to preparedness and situational 
awareness not only for the fire service, but also for all first responders.  The idea of 
focusing on desired outcomes and being flexible in dealing with complexity is critical for 
effecting change within the fire service.  As Smith describes in his book, Complexity, 
Networking, & Effects-Based Approaches to Operations, “The strength of an effects-
based approach to operations is that it squarely addresses these complexities by 
concentrating on their most nonlinear aspects: humans, their institutions, and their 
actions” (2006, p. ix). 
Smith argues that in complex adaptive systems (CAS), using empirical data to 
predict behavior is futile and ineffective.  The non-linearity of complex situations and 
lack of knowledge about how stimuli or systems will react limits the ability to predict 
behavior (Smith, 2006, pp. 93–96). To counter, he suggests that the use of subject matter 
experts to dictate coordinated sets of actions is more prudent because of their unique 
mastery of complex situations (Smith, p. 92). When contextualizing the fire service as a 
CAS, the lesson here, is that it will take a type of transformational leadership that relies 
on field experience, intuition, and the fluidity of the changing landscape to deal with 
terrorist-related issues.  In other words, fire service intelligence will not alone gain  
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traction among firefighters who are presented only with a logical argument for its value.  
It will take a EFOs who are committed to change and real world examples of success and 
impacts to breathe life into the intelligence role.  
Similarly, the unfamiliar improves by being introduced through the lens of what is 
known, tried, and true.  Other scholars have used  CAS as a framework to define  roles 
and relationships among agents, individuals, and communities of individuals who share 
common interests, experience or guiding principles due to their “history or interaction 
and sharing of worldviews” (Lichtenstein, Uhl-Bien, Marion, Seers, Orton, & Schreiber, 
2006, p. 3).  Firefighters don’t necessarily share world views, but they do share a 
common ideology that supports their core mission of protecting lives and property. The 
challenge is to convince firefighters that situational awareness and safety are enhanced by 
adopting intelligence principles. If this occurs, firefighters will be more  receptive.  
Subsequently, over time, they will become more comfortable with the the process of 
intelligence gathering and sharing, and their emergent behavior will embody the doctrine 
of deterring and preventing terrorist activities without compromising their core mission.   
Thus, the transformation will take not only EFO commitment but also a compelling 
argument in terms that firefighters can see as compelling. 
Another evolving trend suggests “effective leadership doesn’t necessarily reside 
within the leader’s symbolic, motivational, or charismatic actions but rather leadership is 
an emerging event resulting from interactions between the agents. These scholars contend 
that “leadership is a dynamic that trancends the capabilities of individuals alone; it is the 
product of interaction, tension, and exchange rules governing changes in perceptions and 
understanding” (Lichtenstein et al., 2006, p. 2).  Moreover, to enable innovative thinking 
through change agents, EFO cannot afford to ignore the importance of the informal 
leaders or they will essentially undermine any chance of affecting organizational 
behavior.  The lesson for fire service acceptance of new roles is that they must be 




The significance of their work to the fire service is rooted in their definition of 
adaptive leadership. They suggest adaptive leadership is “…an interactive event in which 
knowledge, action preferences, and behaviors change, thereby provoking an organization 
to become more adaptive” (Lichtenstein et al., 2006, p. 4).  Although the definition 
focuses on change, more importantly it acknowledges the importance of leadership as a 
means of engaging individual members to generate adaptive outcomes as they resonate 
toward a common interest.  Subsequently by using this definition, the authors claim that 
leadership can occur anywhere within a social system. This is a critical concept for EFOs 
tasked with implementing divergent strategic objectives such as intelligence functions.  In 
other words, engagement is everything, and it is necessary to show, tell, and practice at 
all levels of the organization in order to make implementation a reality. 
At its lowest level, say a department, fire stations or nodes are strategically placed 
in a municipality whereby all of the firefighters in each station report to the chief via the 
chain of command. The chief is generally located at headquarters or the hub of the 
department.  In the larger framework, the fire service is made up of networks of fire 
departments whereby the hub could be considered a major urban fire department and the 
critical nodes are the regional departments who share responsibilities for protecting the 
region.  While each department has a chain of command, its individual culture may or 
may not look like any other within the network. However, it will share the mission of 
protecting life and property across the network. 
Lichtenstein, Uhl-Bien, Marion, Seers, Orton, & Schreiber (2006) suggest there 
are two drivers of adaptive leadership: collective identity formation and tension.  
Collective identity formation occurs because agent interactions are governered by rules 
and mechanisms for changing rules. When interactions in leadership events produce a 
new identity, the fundamental form of rules changes. This identity formation occurs over 
time when participants collaboratively define “who we are” and what we are doing 
through our interactions (Lichtenstein et al., 2006, p. 5).  Comparing the challenges 
facing the fire service, this is precisely what needs to occur if we are to redefine our 
“joint social identity” as first preventors who participate in gathering information that can 
be analyzed, evaluated and disseminated.  In other words, the new role may begin with 
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EFOs explaining what you are supposed to do and why, but it must end with the 
firefighters at the station saying, “this is what we do” even in informal settings. 
Experts assert that tension is the a driver of innovation which occures when the 
“interactions between agents spark tension that leads to adaptive change” (Lichtenstein et 
al., 2006, p. 5).  Accordingly, the resulting tension can be attributed to a realignment of 
agents’ cognitive maps.  This process has been found to generate completely new 
information or, in the case of the fire service, discovering new techniques to deal with 
intelligence that could serve in changing its culture.  Thus, just because the intelligence 
role is new or at times hard to accept does not mean it will necessarily be rejected.  It can 
be a challenge to master rather than a burden to shoulder. 
Meyer, Gaba, and Colwell claim organizational scientists and scholars fail to 
transcend the general linear models that suggest a pervasive assumption of equilibrium 
and linearity (2005). They believe that these assumptions have infused both theories of 
organization and prevailing research methodologies. They argue “beneath mainstream 
social scientific theories and research methods lies what Andrew Abbot calls “a general 
linear reality” (GLR)—a set of deeply held casual beliefs that treat linear models as 
representation of the actual social world” (Abbott 2001; Meyer, Gaba, & Colwell, p. 1), 
and this conceptual baggage is incompatible to the study of fields in flux8.  The relevance 
of their findings is in how organizations will adapt because of non-linear change in 
organizational fields. They observed that when social systems are removed from their 
equilibrium, they did not demonstrate the expected hierarchical rates of change, but rather 
“changes unfolding at the level of a particular field, market,9 or organization can outstrip 
rates of change at either lower or higher levels” (Meyer, Gaba, & Colwell, p. 9).  Based 
on this theory, given proper motivation and training, fire departments across the nation 
will adapt to their expanding role, and they may surprise their own EFOs in how rapidly  
 
 
                                                 
8 The authors question what a social science not conforming to these mutually reinforcing beliefs, 
theories, and methods look like. To support this assertion, they focus their research on “organizational 
fields undergoing discontinuous change” (Meyer, Gaba, & Colwell, 2005, p. 2).  
9“Field” and “market” are terms the researchers used to describe the hyper-turbulent healthcare sector. 
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they do so.  Nevertheless, in the larger scheme, change can be encouraged when 
municipal policy leaders and EFOs recognize the cause and effect of adapting or not 
adapting to meet this critical gap.  
Moreover, their studies demonstrate that non-linear changes stimulated collective 
action and those actions influenced the context that influenced them, resulting in an 
active role in processes of emergence.  By inserting the fire service into this model; we 
can expect out of necessity, major urban fire departments will expand core functions to 
include intelligence actions. Subsequently the fire service as a whole will recognize the 
value, importance and necessity when it emerges as a contributing partner in the 
prevention of terrorism. During this transformation, undoubtedly there will be 
departments which continue to struggle with expanded responsibilities because they may 
perceive this role as a change in the fundamental mission that they are accustomed to. 
Acknowledging this phenomenon will be central to demystifying the term “intelligence” 
within the fire service.   
Furthermore, the strategy of waiting for the law enforcement (LE) community to 
embrace the fire service as a true partner in prevention could mean the difference 
between a fully protected community and one that makes gross assumptions that its 
public safety network engages in a unity of effort.   
B. FIRE SERVICE—INTELLIGENCE 
Although research about intelligence as it applies to three-letter agencies is 
plentiful, very little research about the fire services’ indoctrination into the intelligence 
arena has been conducted outside the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Center for 
Homeland Security and Defense.  Scholars and subject matter experts have researched 
the role of the fire service within the homeland security environment, and most 
acknowledge the pervasive need for intelligence to support the mission of the fire service 
(Blatus, 2008, p. 22; Cloud, 2008, p. 61; Heirston, 2009, p. 37).  
There are several homeland security guidance documents regarding intelligence 
which underscore the emerging role of the fire service.   
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The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security notes, “State, local, and tribal 
governments...provide our first response to incidents through law enforcement, fire, 
public health, and emergency medical services” (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2007, 
p. 4).  
Similarly, according to the National Strategy for Information, incorporating 
counterterrorism strategies into fire departments’ policies, procedures and operating 
guidelines, will enhance the nation’s security capabilities as “First Preventers” and “First 
Responders” (White House, 2007, p. 3). Following 9/11, what formalized this expanded 
role was the Intelligence and Reform Act of 2004.  Specifically section 1016 of the law 
mandated the creation of an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and defined it as, 
“an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information” (ISE, Program 
Manager, 2006).   
To meet the aforementioned strategy, the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise10 
(FSIE) was created to develop a national strategy for the fire service. To date, the 
National Strategy for the Fire Service Enterprise is considered the pre-eminent source for 
intelligence integration in the fire service.  The strategy delineates that fire service 
personnel need ongoing support of intelligence products that include potential or actual 
incident threats so that EFOs can leverage resources toward preparation and response 
capabilities (DHS, 2008, p. 6).   
Moreover, this document outlines strategic objectives for the establishment of a 
national network of fire service organizations that share information and intelligence.  
The initial structure included the participation of fifteen major metropolitan fire 
departments led by the Department of Homeland Security.  Granted, the intent of this 
document - primarily for major urban fire departments - was to address national gaps of 
intelligence sharing across non-traditional partners and the development of new ones.   
For fire departments not participating in the pilot program, it falls short in its national 
                                                 
10 For more on this, “Viewpoints Podcast: ‘Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise” from the Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security Web site: http://www.hsdl.org/hslog/?q=node/4922. 
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focus11 and the absence of specific objectives addressing the challenges of organizational 
change or culture within a large metropolitan fire department.   
Although most of the aforementioned operating principles are beneficial to the 
intelligence community, there are underlying assumptions unilateral information sharing 
already exists and that partners understand each other’s intelligence needs.  One theory 
for this gap is the debate whether firefighters or first responders should actively collect 
intelligence, regardless of the benefits to the fire service and their homeland security 
partners.  
Of the research related to the fire service’s role in the homeland security 
environment, there are several theses written by graduates at the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Center for Homeland Security and Defense.  Most focus on the fire service’s 
emerging role within the homeland security landscape and acknowledge the necessity for 
the transformation of the fire service to both a consumer and producer of intelligence.  
Cloud identifies leadership and intelligence among several emerging issues facing 
the fire service and the asymmetrical threats surrounding the current homeland security 
environment (2008, p. 73).  Additionally, Cloud suggests present fire service leadership is 
hampering homeland security with the lack of a unified mission and singular voice.  
Furthermore, she highlights the criticality for the current fire service leadership to 
“modify organizational culture and traditions that prevent homeland security” (Cloud, 
2008, p. 75).   
Cloud advocates that the fire service should engage in the practice of receiving 
and disseminating intelligence to both fire service personnel and the intelligence 
community (IC) (2008, p. 75), and advocates for the training of firefighters by the IC as a 
means to further their situational awareness by detecting potential terrorist activity.  
Arguably, the inclusion of the fire service in counterintelligence activities would be a 
natural extension of daily activities. 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that the FSIE is a work in progress.  It is relatively new, and has intended to start 
small and grow.  There is no data to suggest the FSIE intentionally disregarded volunteer, wildland or non- 
metropolitan fire departments.  
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Weeks proposes that the primary reason for intelligence gathering and analysis is 
to “avoid strategic surprise” (2007, p. 6).  He argues that this is necessary for the 
protection of personnel and the maximum level of service to the community.  Weeks also 
points out that fire service leadership should question the status quo regarding its 
strategic approach to terrorism and to further enhance the relationship with local law 
enforcement (2007, p. 7). 
Most EFOs would agree that adapting strategies is necessary to meet the 
challenges of terrorism (Welch, 2006, p. 49).  In Welch’s thesis, she suggests that the 
current fire service paradigm has to shift toward terrorist preparedness and training.  
Furthermore, she notes the criticality for that change to come from within the fire service 
or it will be resisted and unsuccessful because of traditional and entrenched values 
supporting organizational culture (2006, p. 50).  She identifies a common misconception 
among firefighters and presumably EFOs with tenure dating pre- 9/11, as the reluctance 
to believe that a terrorist act is likely within their jurisdiction.  Unfortunately, research 
will show that this perspective is clearly perpetuated by EFOs who believe that their 
strategic objectives and resources should be focused on high frequency incidents rather 
than high-risk but low-frequency events such as terrorism. 
Other research examined the training and utilization of fire service personnel as 
an additional resource for the intelligence community (Blatus, 2008, p. 37).  In the thesis 
by Blatus, his research considered the effectiveness of training firefighters in “basic 
intelligence-gathering methods,” and whether the integration of firefighters would 
“enhance or damage their standing as caretakers of the community” (p. 2).  He concluded 
that utilizing the nation’s firefighters to help identify non-traditional criminal activity is a 
logical step toward securing our homeland (p. 39).   
By recognizing that the fire service is a critical public safety partner and the first 
line of defense for terrorism related incidents, EFOs who ignore the concept of fire 
service intelligence stand in opposition to several national strategies and the findings by 




is the recommendation that agency leadership find a new way to organize its resources to 
achieve a “unity of effort” within the intelligence community (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 
399).  
For EFOs, these theses validate the importance of incorporating intelligence into 
strategic objectives and the related necessity for change.  Specifically, necessary changes 
to satisfy an intelligence objective include adapting training, pre-incident planning, and 
tactics so they address suspicious activities and define protocols for reporting them.  
Moreover, if the fire service is to follow these national strategies which suggest 
information gathering and sharing are critical to mission success, the benefit of change 
clearly outweighs the apprehension from firefighter and public safety leaders.  
C. FIRE SERVICE—STRATEGIC PLANNING 
Strategic planning for the fire service generally centers around the paramilitary 
and hierarchical organizational structure which has been in place for well over 200 years. 
Facing today’s homeland security uncertainty calls for rethinking the status quo with a 
hybrid organization offering one alternative to a hidebound hierarchy.  
In Bryson’s Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organization, the central 
premise of a traditional hierarchy is that the organization’s top executive supplies the 
vision that guides strategic planning, policy, and the mission of the organization (2004, p. 
298).  Bryson’s strategic planning is a top down model dependent on “effective 
leadership” which he asserts is central to its success. Without effective leadership, 
constituents struggle to grasp the context of organizational change as it relates to social, 
political, economic, and technical systems and trends (p. 298).  
This top-down method has yet to yield results for the fire service when it comes to 
integrating intelligence functions into a given fire department.  Evidently, the landscape 
of the fire service as a whole more closely approximates a networked model with various 
sizes of departments working with considerable autonomy as long as they can show that 
they are meeting the needs of their respective community. To foster collective leadership 
Bryson posits that, “when strategic planning is successful for public organizations, it is a 
collective achievement” (Bryson, 2004, p. 307).  He maintains an effective method is to 
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use a ten-step process to “organize participation, create ideas for strategic interventions, 
build a winning coalition, and implement strategies” (Bryson, p. 32).   
The scope of this type of strategic planning derives from a set of tools designed 
for executives to “think, act and learn strategically” (Bryson, 2004, p. 297).  Such tools 
may be easy to wield and collectively embrace in settings where executives come from 
schools, work experience, or other pedigrees that place a premium on conformity and 
hierarchical acceptance.  Law enforcement, for example, reinforces such attributes by 
promoting team players; however, the fire service prides itself on independent thinking 
and action.  Consequently, it is more likely to develop firefighters whose maverick nature 
bristles at the prospect of sacrificing individuality.  While such cultural attributes may 
have served EFOs well in a day when heroic rescues were enough, with today’s expanded 
mission, the maverick mentality becomes more of a stumbling block than an asset—
particularly in areas demanding new collaboration, such as intelligence.  Herein lays the 
greatest challenge: teaching EFOs the criticality of collective leadership as a tool for 
strategic planning which would support intelligence functions. 
Under the circumstances, the fire service may be more receptive to a different 
strategy, one whose approach to strategic planning focuses on the creation of uncontested 
market space or blue oceans (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005).  This analytical framework 
proposes simultaneously differentiation in value and innovation as a means of 
overcoming competitors (Kim & Mauborgne, p. 16).  For the purposes of the fire service, 
the introduction of intelligence functions would not be to eliminate competitors, but by 
tapping into this uncharted area the likelihood for potentially eliminating elements of 
strategic surprise may very well lead to a new, blue ocean strategy that incorporates 
intelligence.  
Another variation to challenge the fire service’s status quo would be the adoption 
of an organization founded on principles using the Starfish and the Spider: a flat 
hierarchy, devoid of formal structure, and operating under decentralized decision-making 
(Brafman & Beckstom, 2006). Brafman and Beckstrom use the starfish to illustrate how 
decentralized organizations often thrive without formal leadership or head, while a 
centralized organization, or spider, cannot function without its formal leader.   
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A hybrid approach warrants further consideration as a networked model where 
each department decides how it will adopt intelligence functions within its ranks but, at 
the same time, still contributes to the overall progress of the fire service. Without 
considering and implementing practices rooted in such theories, EFOs limit their ability 
to transform entrenched, traditional fire service paradigms that stand in opposition to 
absorbing intelligence functions. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This literature review has used organizational theory, intelligence policy analysis, 
and a hybrid model for strategic planning as lenses for examining the fire service within 
the homeland security environment.  Despite national doctrine acknowledging the 
importance of introducing non-traditional partners in intelligence functions, the fire 
service is struggling with this new mission.  This research aims to determine whether the 
fire service has evolved to participate and contribute to this mission.  
While the researcher has several assumptions regarding why the fire service has 
not fully embraced the adoption of intelligence functions into its emerging mission, this 
study aims to uncover details that will equip EFOs to answer questions related to 
integrating intelligence principles and transforming their respective departments.  One 
hypothesis is that there may be a disconnect between this expanded role and the rigid 
culture of the fire service.  Alternatively, this research may uncover a correlation between 
effective role adoption and fire service leadership. Certainly there are external factors to 
consider, such as the sometimes turbulent relationship with law enforcement relative to 
sharing intelligence and security clearances.  
In driving this line of inquiry, the main purposes of this thesis are to identify 
specific issues that undermine implementation and to address strategic initiatives to 
overcome this shortfall.  Accordingly, research addressing the following questions should 
provide crucial insight for EFOs and government decision makers considering the 
expanded role of its local fire department personnel.  
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How can the fire service transform its current paradigm to one best suited to the 
demands of emerging homeland security intelligence and information sharing? 
What barriers are impeding the adoption of intelligence functions? 
1. Benefactors and Future Research Efforts 
Benefactors from this research will be fire service and homeland security leaders 
responsible for contributing to the prevention of terrorism through intelligence and 
information sharing.  Leaders in the fire service will better understand their roles in 
homeland security intelligence functions that will contribute to preventing, preparing, and 
responding to terrorism.  
Law enforcement and policy makers will gain insight to the cultural challenges 
and value of the fire service as they all continue to prepare for threat of terrorism.  
Future research efforts should pursue the effectiveness of a continuing education 
program founded in homeland security curricula to address intelligence in the fire 
service.  Likewise, a vast shortage of research invites future attention to fire service 
impact of the following trends: 
• Terrorism awareness outreach programs 
• Fusion center integration of the fire service 
• Implications for civil liberties 
• Suspicious activity reporting 




III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis derived its analytical support from a literature review and a Delphi 
method of surveys and interviews. Research began with the examination of relevant 
national strategies related to homeland security, intelligence, and the fire service.  Next,  
subject matter experts12 (SMEs) from the fire service were selected for their possession 
of relevant experience of intelligence practices and their involvement with fusion centers 
or similar, multi-disciplinary communities engaged in the process of sharing 
intelligence/information or counterterrorism efforts.  
The Delphi panel size and composition reflected the limited availability of fire 
service personnel with this type of background. Selecting the SMEs began with the roster 
of the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise Workgroup and the 2009 National Fusion 
Center Conference Attendee list. These two sources provided approximately fifty EFO to 
select from however, only nine chose to participate.  While this sample size would appear 
low, in practice, informed analysts have stated that “the sample size varies...from 4 to 
171’experts.’ One quickly concludes that there is no ‘typical’ Delphi; rather that the 
method is modified to suit the circumstances and research question” (Skulmoski, 
Harman, & Krahn, 2007, p. 5). Other analysts, applying the Delphi method to policy 
issues, found useful sample sizes varying from 10 to 50 experts (Linstone, & Turoff, 
2002, p. 82).  
In following the Delphi method, the core group of SMEs would serve as a means 
to investigate and confirm the validity of the main premise of this thesis.  The SMEs 
participated in three rounds of surveys consisting of open-ended questions to draw 
meaningful contributions and practical experience. It was through this process that 
researcher gained access to additional SMEs critical to this body of research.  
The significance of these additional members was based on their participation in 
national fire service intelligence and homeland security initiates in the National Capital 
                                                 
12  Subject matter expert describes an individual who is an expert in a particular area, topic, or subject. 
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Region (NCR) that by default of their location, positioned these SMEs in proximity to the 
threat of terrorism on a daily basis. Likewise, their exposure to these challenges would 
glean success and failures in collaborative efforts to sharing information and intelligence 
that is paramount to understanding the barriers to fire service intelligence.  
One of the SMEs serves as the Terrorism and Homeland Security Chair for the 
International Association of Fire Chiefs and is on the advisory committee for the 
Interagency Threat Assessment & Coordination Group (ITACG).13 Another served as 
chair of the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise Workgroup and co-chaired the National 
Capital Region Fire Chief Intelligence working group. While the third is the first 
firefighter detailed to the ITACG assigned to the National Counterterrorism Center. 
Because they fill critical roles in the fire service and participate directly with the national 
intelligence community, they clearly had practical experience that would contribute 
greatly to this thesis.  
Each agreed to a personnel interview in Washington D.C. in the fall of 2009 that 
consisted of questions scripted from the original surveys but similar to the surveys, these 
open-ended questions allowed for unique perspectives while guiding the participants in a 
uniform manner. Following the interviews, their responses where coded along with the 
survey participants to formulate common themes and as the basis to generate each 
additional round of questioning.  
This research method was best suited to collect original data from individual 
respondents about “perceptions, attitudes or beliefs” (Thomas, 2006, p. 3) related to the 
issue of fire service intelligence implementation.  Most importantly, their practical 
experience and opinions where gathered with the intent to determine the relationship 
between fire service leadership and the deep challenges of adapting a rigid culture to 
meet the emerging intelligence mission. 
                                                 
13 For information regarding the ITACG see Chapter V or http://www.ise.gov/pages/partner-
itacg.html. 
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B. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Although the fire service includes over 30,000 fire departments, the most actively 
engaged or challenged EFOs operate in major urban fire departments. These EFO’s 
subsequently have a higher likelihood of exposure to terrorism and correspondingly will 
have exposure to a state or regional fusion centers and challenges related to 
intelligence/information sharing.  Thus, major urban fire departments supplied all of the 
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IV. TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
Today’s American fire service must contend with a dynamic and asymmetrical 
threat environment compared to the typical response requirements from as recently as 
within this decade.  To meet the challenges of urban terrorism, the core functions of the 
fire service continue to expand and evolve beyond the normal arena that encompassed 
standard life safety capabilities.  In response, fire leaders are called to identify gaps and 
develop strategic planning that leverages available resources to provide the highest leave 
of readiness.   
Within this framework, Executive Fire Officers (EFOs) have responded by 
shifting the focus of training from skills necessary for basic fire core functions to those 
geared toward the enhancement of operational capabilities to mitigate incidents of 
weapons of mass destruction.  Unfortunately, Executive Fie Officers have not put equal 
efforts in the collaborative process of information gathering and sharing with law 
enforcement or non-traditional partners. Additionally, the leadership of the fire service 
has not embraced concepts typically considered intelligence functions that would clearly 
contribute to their situational awareness and operational readiness.   
To adopt intelligence functions and policies that are necessary tools for the 
metaphoric tool chest and in an effort to reform the culture of the fire service, EFO must 
capitalize on novel leadership styles that inspire “change agents” committed to valuable 
and positive change within their organizations. Some theorists suggest a transformational 
leader is charismatic and that leadership is a critical driving force for change. Likewise, 
“leadership has always been a desirable model and major contributor to progress in many 
cultures” (Waite, 2008, p. 2).   
Firefighting as a profession requires individuals to face life and death decisions at 
a moment’s notice. In the heat of the moment, a firefighter expects the leader to make 
judgment calls that mitigate personal risk and introduce order into chaos. During these 
situations, charisma alone will not overcome a deficiency in trust between leader and 
subordinate.  The leaders firefighters are most inclined to follow are those who repeatedly 
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demonstrate sound judgment in life-or-death situations and who build strong bonds of 
trust along the way.  Consequently, if the fire service is to overcome subordinate 
resistance to making the transition from first responder to first preventer, the logical 
strategy is to associate the change to situations involving life and death in a way that the 
most respected EFOs are seen to embrace.  This strategy offers the best opportunity to 
leverage traditional cultural bias in overcoming equally traditional resistance to 
institutional change.  
Crisis leadership demands that members have an awareness of their organizational 
culture and the relationship to decision making during a crisis (Willett, 2008).  If the 
organization empowers others to make decisions in the service of a higher mission—and 
even to make mistakes—then this organization will produce leaders who think for 
themselves and act for the greater good of their teams and organizations.  The shift in 
focus from first responder to first preventer demands precisely such leadership, which in 
turn requires a philosophical transformation. 
Transformational leadership begins with a vision that sets realistic objectives, 
offers clear guidance, and supplies an effective organization to set in motion necessary 
strategic initiatives.  Considering that the traditional core mission of the fire service 
focuses on life safety, property conservation and environmental protection, it is 
imperative to expand the mission to adapt and acknowledge additional responsibilities 
like the role of intelligence sensor (Blatus, 2008).  Redefining the mission statement then 
becomes not only a clear acknowledgement of adapting to the post-9/11 threat 
environment, but also a recurring reminder that today’s firefighter no longer has the 
option of focusing exclusively on yesterday’s mission.  Expanding the mission statement 
becomes an important step in the direction of seamless transition from first responder to 
first preventer.   
While the average American citizen has been bombarded with news of real and 
potential terrorist threatening the homeland, the fire service has continued to face 
unabated demands for service in ways that make it easy to return to a business-as-usual 
mind set.  Consequently, if the fire service is to adapt to remain vital and successful it 
needs to cultivate a deliberate, purposeful understanding of the implications of terrorism 
 27
to its mission.  This understanding, in turn, will enable the fire service to embrace on a 
professional level the kind of paradigm shift that the citizenry have realized on a personal 
level (i.e., that post-9/11 America is a different, more dangerous world).  
Culturally, the fire service sustains a tradition of developing leaders through on-
the-job training and promotional examinations unique to each department or jurisdiction.  
The premise is that each time fire officers are put in harm’s way, they intuitively acquire 
knowledge from making split-second, complex operational decisions. Likewise, the 
presumption is that exposure to and experience in adapting to dynamic and exigent 
circumstances produces capable fire officers who are equipped and prepared for action.  
While the U.S. fire service has evolved from trade to profession, the industry rarely 
requires that executive fire officers pursue formal education to validate this evolution.  
The benefit in incorporating formal education into the profession goes beyond 
giving fire officers a broader understanding of the threat environment.  Professional 
education improves fire officer grasp and implementation of department policy and 
procedures.  It also provides context and strategies for navigating across political 
dimensions of any complex institution.  Furthermore, while the existing culture produces 
leaders that are comfortable with handling life-threatening situations as a matter of 
routine, the service does not necessarily equip leaders with the skill set to pursue 
institutional change.   
One expert in behavioral science at the United States Military Academy suggests 
that leading in a “life or death” situation is different from managing in mundane 
circumstances, although good leaders share some universal traits (Kolditz, 2007, p. 20).  
Kolditz identifies those who lead in high-risk situations as in extremis leaders.  He asserts 
that in extremis leaders must rapidly contend with an external environment, acquire 
relevant information and make decisions based on how the situation evolves and the level 
of danger they are facing (Kolditz, p. 20). He sees the identical motivation animating 
both leaders and followers, because of their shared risk and high level of mutual trust.       
In the fire service, leaders must capitalize on these theories and begin by moving 
away from transactional leadership toward transformational leadership.  The former 
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focuses on immediate problem solving, as in responding to an emergency, while the latter 
focuses on the longer view and wider perspective necessary for anticipating or preventing 
emergencies.  Indeed, it is this transformational leadership that prioritizes intelligence 
functions as a necessary implement in the fire officer’s tool chest. The bridge between the 
two kinds of leadership is their linkage to life and death situations, which constitute the 
familiar comfort zone of the fire officer.  
While most significant incidents require ongoing assessment, the reality is that 
knowledge prior to an event is even more valuable and can make the difference between 
saving lives with minimal exposure of rescuers or placing rescuers in grave peril without 
being able to save victims in time.  It is the difference between evacuating all occupants 
of a building on receiving early warning of a likely gas leak, as opposed to saving none of 
them after the gas has permeated the building and been ignited by a smoker. 
Most EFOs have not fully accepted that the fire service should perform 
intelligence functions when there remain other resource demands.  Consequently, fire 
service intelligence receives little or no priority, hence its influence on operational 
readiness continues to be underestimated.   As a result, this attitude undermines national 
initiatives like the FSIE and also limits active fire service participation in fusion centers.   
To overcome this mind-set, EFOs need to recognize the situational awareness 
value that intelligence offers prior to and during a terrorist event.  EFOs must also lead 
fire officers in taking on the role of first preventer.  Once EFOs themselves see how fire 
service-originated or -shared intelligence can prevent fatalities from a terrorist attack, 
they can identify champions within their departments to embrace the first preventer role 
and overcome institutional resistance.     
A by-product of this transformation would be the basis for engaging in multi-
sector partnerships. When EFOs question whether incorporating terrorism awareness and 
reporting suspicious activity fall within the public safety mission, they risk compromising 
the safety of the firefighters expected to be the front line of protection.  To accomplish 
this transformational paradigm shift, the fire service needs a common purpose to become 
all-hazards public safety leaders—first preventers - or the fire service will essentially be 
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left behind. In changing this mind-set, EFOs must convey purpose and direction by 
articulating their vision.  Absent this clearly communicated vision, future initiatives will 
capsize shortly after launch.   
Transparent transformation begins with educating EFOs that situational awareness 
and safety are enhanced by adopting intelligence principles.  As their collective attitudes 
change, the natural progression is that their departments will follow and, likewise, 
firefighters become more receptive and willing to embrace these practices.  The resutling 
force-multiplier14 produces a safer communty, a better prepared fire department, and 
enhanced collaborative relationships with law enforcement and intelligence agencies who 
collectively deter terrorist activies.   
A. EXECUTIVE FIRE OFFICER DEVELOPMENT 
As fire officers advance through the ranks to positions responsible for policy 
development, or the Executive Fire Officer level, they face opportunities to remain within 
the current culture and status quo or to explore new directions and take leadership risks.  
Though EFO and leadership appear to go hand in hand, this does not mean all fire 
officers who become EFOs are leaders. Nevertheless, fire departments rely on the 
promotional process to identify, nurture, and develop those with leadership potential.  
These promotions, when combined with formal education, prepare candidates for a 
critical homeland security role.  
Attitudes and beliefs that mirror current fire service culture must be challenged 
and should be adapted to align with the demands facing chief officers as homeland 
security leaders. “Homeland Security Leader” is a title that many fire service officers 
resist, universally arguing, “That’s not what I signed up for.”  However, a quick review 
of the recent history of unprecedented calamities suggests otherwise.  The reality is that 
fire officers who enter the field as contributors to public safety can no longer ignore the  
 
 
                                                 
14 Force multiplier, here, is adapted from the military term that denotes a capability that significantly 
increases the potential of a given force, thus enhancing probability of success.  Refer to 
www.TheFreeDictionary.com for a current definition of this term. 
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evidence that the role of the fire service has expanded.  A chief today could legitimately 
counter, “If you are an active fire service leader and are still drawing a paycheck, this is 
precisely what you did sign up for.” 
As recent history has indicated, acts of terrorism and induced or natural disasters 
are unpredictable.  They expand exponentially, and can quickly become unmanageable.  
Most agree “responders are responsible for intervening before and during such events, to 
minimize the harm disasters cause and to restore order” (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006, pp. 2–
3).  Regardless of their cause, large-scale incidents rapidly overwhelm local resources 
and test local government’s ability to implement the Incident Command System (ICS).  
Yet the core of ICS includes acknowledging the criticality of multidisciplinary 
collaboration and the exchange of intelligence or information.     
Furthermore, to enhance the fire service’s introduction and mastery of fire service 
intelligence, major urban departments must collaborate in crafting specific programs 
structured to expose fire service leaders to the wider homeland security arena.  The 
absence of strategic initiatives to address this gap can no longer excuse self-imposed 
obsolescence.  Instead, the fire service has a duty to develop standard curricula that 
support each department’s promotional process similar to how the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) training became a requirement for incident management 
across the country (White House, 2003, p. 3).  Moreover, the value added by undertaking 
a structured curriculum that increases exposure to the intelligence machinery and affords 
hands-on experience can be readily associated with minimizing the effects of terrorism 
and supporting the expanded fire service mission. 
One theory within the fire service is that there remains a lack of understanding of 
what role fire fighters play in the homeland security enterprise.  As evidence, one need 
only examine fire department training course offerings, forums, Web sites, research 
papers, and conference announcements, as captured in the National Fire Academy’s 
database.  In all of these repositories and representations of fire service expertise, 




of relying on tactical experience as the basis for identifying future chief officers affords 
virtually no incentive to stay current and develop new knowledge and skills that keep 
pace with the fire service’s evolving mission.   
Consequently, this obsolete, archaic tradition in essence devalues education and 
innovation, while cementing resistance to change and, even worse, increasing potential 
opportunities for failure.  Without a purposeful shift away from this dogmatic paradigm, 
future chief officers risk certain, catastrophic failure to meet as yet unforeseen threats.  
On the other hand, if the paradigm shifts in favor of evolving to adapt to emerging threats 
and to keep pace with the expanding mission of the fire service, then departments making 
this evolutionary leap will demonstrate their commitment to preparing their leaders and 
better positioning their agencies to be a critical partner in today’s homeland security 
environment.  
One place to look for answers is with critical thinkers from the emerging field of 
homeland security.  In taking his own question as an analytical challenge, namely, 
“Changing Homeland Security: What Is Homeland Security?” one observer identifies at 
least seven defensible definitions, which he refers to as “ideal types” (Bellavita, 2008, p. 
1).15  He adds that each definition is rooted in an interpretation that supports a set of 
interests found in a particular homeland security niche (Bellavita, p. 10).  He further 
suggests that there are arguments to support both a singular definition and a combination 
of the definitions (Bellavita, p. 21).   
Bounding the definition of homeland security limits the practical application of 
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery across disciplines and in particular the 
fire service.  Comparatively, the 2007 Homeland Security Strategy definition of 
homeland security suggests homeland security is everyone’s responsibility: “Homeland 
Security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, 
reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from 
attacks that do occur” (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2007). 
                                                 
15 Bellavita (2008) explains that he is using “ideal types” in the contexts of Max Weber. His intent is, 
“to characterize the central features of a particular type” (Bellavita, 2008).  
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Today’s homeland security environment provides an excellent opportunity to 
implement a structured course of action for the cultivation of the fire service geared 
toward protecting the homeland.  Albeit as a precursor to institutionalizing a training 
curriculum, this will become the norm rather than an exception. As one researcher 
asserts, “learning is, at its core, a process of growth; thus a successful learning process 
requires a commitment to change” (Donahue, 2006).   
A common assumption about adult students is that they only learn if they are 
motivated (Argyris, 1991).  In the fire service, the primary catalyst for motivation comes 
in the form of meeting grant requirements to support state or federal standards. This top-
down mandatory training perpetuates a narrow strategy to learning, rather than a 
proactive one, and tends to focus on training to support equipment acquisitions.  Of 
course, this is not to discount the importance of grant funding to support a department’s 
operational readiness. However, if the only reason for fire officers to pursue new 
education is to ease financial burdens of their fire department, the learning will stop with 
the cashing of the last grant check.  At some point EFOs need a strategic vision that 
regards learning not as the means to a near-term monetary reward but as the long-term 
edge in surviving the next challenge in a constantly changing and dangerous 
environment.  
According to a comparative analysis of the fire service’s espoused “theory-of-
action” contrasted with its “theory-in-use,” (Argyris, 1991)16 EFOs have vast, yet 
inconsistent levels of training and experience.  Thus, if EFO proficiency and comfort 
with intelligence functions appear inconsistent, it would seem that these functions exist 
on a field where they roll from the opposing goal posts of theory-of-action and theory-of-
use, depending on the individual EFO.  A logical step to overcome this dysfunctional 
oscillation between theories is for fire officers to gain a common understanding of what 
the role of the fire service is in the homeland security enterprise.  In particular, if they can 
first obtain and then articulate a common grasp of its underlying dependence on non- 
 
                                                 
16 Argyris explains that there is a paradox between the espoused “theory-of-action,”—or what people 
think they do—compared to “theory-in-use,” what they actually do (1991).  
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traditional partners and a shared responsibility for public safety built on trust in mutual 
competency, then EFOs will be able to instill an appreciation of intelligence in their own 
ranks.  
1. What Are Other Departments Doing? 
As a basis for comparison, Table 1 Comparative Analysis from the West Coast 
Seven depicts an overview of the promotional processes for developing chief officers and 
the municipal hierarchy for emergency management (Gonzales, 2008, p. 8).  The data 
was acquired through a survey sent to comparably sized urban fire departments located 
within the western region of the United States and referred to as the “west coast seven.”17  
Fire departments were asked several open-ended questions regarding promotional 
process, requirements and the emergency response hierarchy for their jurisdictions.  The 
researcher found that some of the questions turned out to be too vague and did not 
produce expected results around the issues of collaboration via the existence of a 
homeland security division or through emergency management. Nevertheless, there was 
ample data to interpret about the educational and training requirements for promotion to 
the chief officer level.  
Table 1.   Comparative Analysis from the West Coast Seven (After Gonzales, 2008, p. 8)   
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17 The “West Coast Seven” is a term used to identify the seven comparable fire departments located on 
the west coast used in labor negotiations between the city of Seattle and the Seattle Firefighters Union 
Local 27 (Gonzales, 2008, p. 7). 
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One conclusion drawn from the data clearly confirms that Seattle Fire is not 
unique in its lack of educational requirements or formal training for chief officers.  
Although, the data indicates a common theme of an inconsistent promotional process to 
select future leaders, what stands out is the premise that upon being promoted to chief 
officer, departments essentially abandon their professional growth with the lack of 
required continuing education or training during probationary periods or once they have 
the “bugles.”  A sampling of these departments also indicated that their departments don’t 
have a division or members focused on homeland security efforts nor do they require any 
formal education or training of EFO to support homeland security initiatives.  
Formal and informal training was another area that proved inconsistent across the 
group.  While some departments have formal training during probation - most did not, the 
probation period is inconsistent.  San Jose Fire reported that a formal training curriculum 
is in development, and only one department—Long Beach Fire—has a formal training 
program called the Chief Officers Continuing Education Program or  COCEP which had 
yet to be implemented at the time of the survey. 
The survey results also show that all departments use a formal promotional 
process to select chief officers, yet differ in process design.  For example, Portland Fire 
and Rescue (PFR) selects chief officers by using an assessment center that does not 
include a written exam. Portland’s chief candidates participate in the assessment center 
followed by an interview with the chief of the department, during which the candidates 
present a resume.   
What conclusions can be gleaned from this data?  As an industry, the fire service 
continues to depend on “on-the-job” training founded in tactical experience.  More 
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important, there is a gap in structured training of chief officers that is contrary to the 
expectation for local fire departments to engage in advance readiness activities that 
support the larger National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
Transforming organizational culture relative to formal education and training is a 
difficult and enormous undertaking; however, the adage, “change starts at the top” is 
most evident in an industry founded on a paramilitary structure such as the fire service. 
Before design and implementation takes place, an important question to consider is, does 
the fire service need another all-encompassing doctrine or set of regulations and 
operating procedures based on prevailing attitudes toward terrorism prevention and 
intelligence?   
Clearly, this would not benefit the larger homeland security enterprise, nor would 
this meet the intent of fire service intelligence.  It is the responsibility of the fire service 
to draft the precept delineating the first preventer model focusing on counterterrorism 
directly and indirectly, which in turn provides chief officers with the latitude to be 
innovative in creating this curriculum.  By tapping into the collective experience of EFOs 
working collaboratively with law enforcement or other partners engaging in intelligence 
and information sharing would be an excellent starting point in defining what chief 
officers need to know.  
The fire service must make an institutional commitment to continuing education 
that promotes learning as a means to prepare EFOs.  Experience cannot be ignored or 
discounted, however experience with education is more effective.  A change in the 
promotional process is the foundation for future design of a continuing education 
program.  By using a best practices approach in its delineation and incorporating a 
learning process using military-style →crawl→ walk → run structure, the department 
would make positive strides toward the elimination of lessons we fail to learn. 
Designing a formal chief officer development program using a model, that 




less by narrow knowledge and arcane technical and operational detail” (Foster, 1996) 
would result in a value added investment for the fire service as a whole.  Education 
should be a consideration for promotion.  
Formal or informal, without an educational requirement for promotion, the fire 
service will risk being left behind while the homeland security enterprise continues to 
roll.  The value added by undertaking a structured curriculum designed to increase 
exposure to the intelligence machinery and hands-on experience is the cornerstone to 
minimizing the effects of terrorism and subsequently supports the expanded mission of 
the fire service. 
B. MULTI-ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
In the book Megacommunities, the role of the initiator cannot be understated.  An 
initiator can make the difference between a transformative approach that is successful and 
sustainable and the demise of such an emergent issue.  While initiators are necessary to 
getting a megacommunity off the ground, they are extraordinary at building network 
capital (Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 121). The utility of 
megacommunity thinking equates to the call for some profound adjustments in attitude on 
the part of participating individuals, especially those in active leadership or liaison roles 
(Gerencser et al., 2008, p. 82).   
A by-product of this transformation would be the basis for engaging in multi-
sector partnerships to overcome barriers of adopting intelligence functions in the fire 
service.  This mindset underscores the need to detangle some deeply entrenched and 
ingrained habits of thought (Gerencser et al., 2008, p. 82).   
To engage in a multi-organizational strategy, EFOs must start by addressing 
cultural and institutional barriers to fire service intelligence functions.  While 
acknowledging there is internal and external opposition, the most prudent place to start is 
to transform the fire service culture by demonstrating the value proposition of adopting 
this discipline.  Because intelligence has been law enforcement (LE) centric, even while 
the LE community evolves from a criminal centric policing to terrorism related activity, 
there is no greater need than now to include the fire service 
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An equally important aspect of multi-organizational leadership is using a tri-
sector approach to positive effect.  In the “megacommunity framework,” collaboration 
begins by identifying counterterrorism and information/intelligence sharing as a common 
interest across both law enforcement and the fire service sector.  Both industries need to 
recognize the complex interdependency of preventing terrorism, regardless of historical 
non-involvement by firefighters.  Though this relationship is critical to the process, 
today’s dynamic threat environment requires a holistic strategy that also includes civilian 
participation.  By extending participation in this way, first responders demonstrate their 
understanding that terrorism defense and homeland protection are not only their problem 
to solve but a responsibility shared universally with all citizens of their communities. 
1. Tri-Sector Engagement 
The authors of Megacommunities assert that the convergence of multi-sectors 
creates tension that is necessary for balance (Gerencser et al., 2008). Specifically, when 
managed properly, megacommunity principles create a dynamic tension between sectors 
that enhances their ability to handle overlapping vital interests (Gerencser et al., 2008, p. 
56).  For example, Seattle Fire, Washington State Troopers and the Washington 
Department of Transportation (WDOT) share motor vehicle accident responses on 
Interstate 5 through downtown Seattle, but each agency has unique operational 
requirements.  For a motor vehicle accident, Seattle Fire is focused on the medical 
emergency and packaging the injured in a safe and efficient manner which requires 
closing a minimum of two lanes.  The lane or lanes the motor vehicle accident has 
occurred in and an additional lane for safety or a buffer zone.  Troopers need to secure 
the scene and conduct an accident investigation while fire is evaluating and preparing the 
injured for transport. WDOT workers, on the other hand, are concerned with clearing the 
highway as it is a major thoroughfare for commerce and the public.  When all three 
entities discuss their various proclivities and operational requirements in the context of a 
combined response, each can learn from the other, pose scenarios that the other may have 




each other to meet their respective missions without undue interference.  The tri-sector 
engagement in terrorism prevention and defense can similarly engage the fire service, law 
enforcement, and citizens.   
While the process of sharing information will primarily fall within the law 
enforcement and fire service legs of the megacommunity triangle,  these disciplines must 
recognize that to be true to the larger mission of securing the homeland, they alone 
cannot completely deter nor protect the American people without engaging other sectors.  
The public’s assistance in recognizing suspicious activity is invaluable and a 
necessary force multiplier in a landscape where there are never enough first responder 
eyes and ears to detect every warning sigh.  By including this sector early in the process, 
EFOs can minimize negative law enforcement reactions to firefighter participation.  After 
all, if the public is recognized as a necessary partner, it is hardly defensible to exclude the 
fire service from intelligence collaboration, since fire fighters are responders and 
members of the non-police public.  Additionally, inclusion will have positive returns by 
generating political support in the best-case scenario.  Conversely, an engaged citizenry 
supplies feedback for both the positive and negative implications of approaches to this 
shared problem.  Without public involvement, there is very little chance that intelligence 
initiatives will sustain lasting political support or funding. 
Engaging citizens to be diligent in reporting suspicious activities in their 
communities will undoubtedly enhance the value of terrorism awareness.  Any preventive 
strategy is doomed to failure if citizens have no role to play and, instead, rely exclusively 
on the vigilance of their responder community.  Moreover, if fire departments are to 
become partners in anti-terrorist activities through awareness and reporting, informing 
their communities prior to full implementation of these practices is critical.  Averting 
resistance to preventive measures and negative reaction to perceived infringement of civil 
liberties requires a coordinated public education campaign.  The focus of such a 
campaign would be delineating the process for firefighters to carry out their new 
intelligence duties without doing so at the expense of the bond of trust between average 
citizen and firefighter. 
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There are several examples of successful outreach programs domestically and 
internationally.  In New York City there is the, If You See Something, Say Something 
campaign, which includes a toll free number to report suspicious activities (New York 
State Office of Homeland Security, n.d.).  Additionally, the state of New York Office of 
Homeland Security has developed publications geared toward the public as well as 
several disciplines beyond public safety.18  Arizona boasts a similar campaign for citizens 
to report suspicious activity to the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 
(ACTIC).  ACTIC also recognized the value of information from citizens to provide leads 
to police on terrorist activity.  In fact, ACTIC collaborated with the Phoenix Fire 
Department to create the video, “8 Signs of Terrorism” (ACTC, 2008–2010).  
In Colorado, Governor Ritter unveiled “Recognizing the eight signs of terrorism,” 
a video produced with grant funding by the Department of Homeland Security, to educate 
the Colorado citizens on their shared responsibility of recognizing terrorist activity (DHS, 
2009).  “The vigilance of individual citizens is critical to protecting our country from the 
threat of terrorism,” said Secretary Napolitano. “This video provides essential 
information on how to identify the warning signs, and emphasizes the vital role of such 
assistance in state and local law enforcement’s counterterrorism efforts” (DHS, 2009). 
In Lancashire County, England, the constabulary succeeded in promoting 
community awareness on the nature of terrorist threats by making effective use of a 
national handbook (DHS, 2009).  On the one hand, Lancashire gained notice as a 
geographic “hotspot” for terrorism and also as a challenge to local authorities because of 
negative public reaction to local policing tactics (DHS, 2009).  However, the Lancashire 
constabulary turned around negative perceptions through successful public outreach 
programs. Using the same handbook developed by the Home Office and successfully put 
into practice in Lancashire, local law enforcement can implement a similar Prevent19  
 
 
                                                 
18 The New York State Office of Homeland Security has outreach brochures for fire/EMS, maritime, 
mass transit, and agriculture.  
19 For further information on the Prevent strategy, see the Lancashire Constabulary Web page: 
http://lancs.netefficiency.co.uk/index.php?id=5274. 
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strategy by engaging members of the community in awareness programs as a step in the 
direction of increasing jurisdictional support for community policing initiatives against 
terrorism (DHS, 2009).   
Through the All Communities Together Now (ACT Now) program, Operation 
Topcat, and Not in My Name I the Lancashire Constabulary relied on active participation 
of several ethnic and faith-based community groups to breathe life into its outreach 
programs (DHS, 2009).  As a result, citizens who were on the point of demanding police 
resignations became transformed into the staunchest advocates of the same officers.  Yet 
none of the personalities of citizen or defender had changed.  Instead, the success 
followed a change in how police began to engage their fellow citizens.  Ultimately, the 
success of the community outreach program was attributed to the newly trained officers’ 
level of awareness of cultural differences within their communities (DHS, 2009). 
In the larger scheme of things, within any megacommunity it takes ongoing 
negotiations with all sectors to sustain constant stakeholder engagement (Gerencser et al., 
2008, p. 100).  As formal processes are established defining roles, responsibilities and 
expectations, the element of negotiation preserves the innovative and adaptable nature of 
a megacommunity (Gerencser et al.). 
Key to adopting intelligence functions into the fire service is moving away from a 
strategy with a single sector point of view.  The evolving strategy will contribute to the 
inclusion of existing networks and add diversity of perspective to information or 
intelligence.  Social network analysis has shown the value of diversity whereby 
communities which tap into differences are generally more successful compared to those 
which cling to homogeneity.  At Stanford University, Granovetter’s studies of network 
theory found that “weak ties” (or casual and temporary acquaintances) in a network 
introduce information not normally available and, subsequently, those with robust 
networks of “weak ties” are profoundly more informed (Gerencser et al., 2008, p. 72). 
Moreover, this type of network becomes highly adaptable and “scale-free” (Gerencser et 
al., 2008, p. 73). 
 41
C. STRATEGIC PLANNING 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, several federal 
initiatives emphasized the importance of cross collaboration between government 
agencies. Though most initiatives highlighted the critical need for multi-disciplinary 
coalitions, a consistent objective remained arriving at improved homeland security by 
stimulating collaboration of non-traditional partners.  
In that vein, major urban fire departments have an obligation to develop 
systemized strategies to deal with terrorism and disasters by ensuring that chiefs 
understand these strategies and put them into practice.  As echoed by participants of a 
focus group providing emergency responder perspective on this issue, one fire chief 
lamented, “It’s terrorism, terrorism, terrorism…and I can’t use my resources for the 
things I know I’ll face.  So how many major non-terrorism incidents do we have to have 
before DHS gets us resources for other things than WMD?” (Donahue, 2006, p. 10).   
Most EFOs see terrorism prevention as a waste of valuable and limited resources, 
because they overlook the potential that terrorism awareness may contribute to 
operational readiness.  They certainly miss the connection that an all-hazards approach to 
preparedness is founded on the observation that “building capacity to deal with the most 
probable events will increase capacity to deal with less probable events” (Waugh, 2004). 
The fire service’s mission of life safety and property conservation dates back to 
the late 1800s.20 Over the past 30 years, the mission has embodied strategies for 
preparedness, response, and recovery to acts of terrorism. Only recently have first 
responders been included in the preventive discussions of thwarting terrorism.  Following 
9/11, what formalized this expanded role was the Intelligence and Reform Act of 2004.  
Specifically, section 1016 of the law mandated the creation of an Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE) and defined it as, “an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism 
information” (ISE Program Manager, 2006).   
                                                 
20 Benjamin Franklin is credited with establishing the first fire brigade in Philadelphia, called the 
Union Fire Company, on December 7, 1735 (ushistory.org, 1999–2010).  
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An important aspect of the ISE is the recognition that the informational needs of 
state, local, and tribal entities expand as counterterrorism and homeland security 
activities are integrated into daily missions.  To that end, the fire service has historically 
been a consumer of intelligence.  Moreover, access to “timely, credible, and actionable 
information and intelligence” has generally been slow or non-existent, despite its crucial 
role for public safety and maintaining a fire department’s state of readiness (ISE Program 
Manager, 2006).  
In contrast, the ISE Program Manager envisions a fire service better served by 
reconsidering its role within homeland security and pursuing a strategy that anticipates 
the need to transition from traditional first responder toward the more progressive role of 
a first preventer.  Creating the capacity to gather, assess and analyze relevant information 
and subsequently share it with law enforcement or local fusion centers magnifies conflict 
between firefighters and the law enforcement community.  At the administrative level, 
EFOs must contend with LE peers who have chronically resisted inclusion of the fire 
service as a partner in intelligence (confidential personnel communication, September 24, 
2009). Overcoming this inter-organizational chafing means being able to witness 
meaningful collaboration at the local level—the kind of change that must evolve over 
time in order to take hold, rather than the kind attainable solely by mandates of 
executives. 
In their book Blue Ocean Strategy, analysts Kim and Mauborgne (2005) offer a 
systemic approach to strategic planning that focuses on the creation of uncontested 
market space, or “blue oceans.”  Their analytical framework proposes simultaneously 
pursuing differentiation in value and innovation as a means of making one’s competition 
irrelevant (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 16). 
In the context of the fire service, a blue ocean posture is the undefined value from 
integrating fire service networks with non-traditional partners while incorporating 
terrorism awareness strategies.  This shift from the supply side—the fire service’s role in 
first responder preparedness, response and recovery—to the demand side—how public 
safety can be enhanced as a first preventer—reframes the market of the fire service’s  
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mission. Ultimately, this transformation equates to redefining how the fire service 
conducts business and how its role evolves within the greater homeland security mission 
of terrorism prevention.  
Figure 1 offers a visual depiction of the value innovation possible in such a 
transformation. The horizontal axis depicts the factors the fire service must contend with, 
and the vertical axis captures the degree of effort or investment to accomplish the specific 
strategy. The strategy curves correspond with the differences. 
 
Figure 1.   Strategy Canvas (After Kim & Mauborgne, 2005) 
While the status quo for the modern fire service is to operate using a red ocean 
strategy as a first responder, a blue ocean strategy would be the fire service functioning as 
a first preventer.   
Figure 2 depicts the six main principles that drive the formulation and execution 
of blue ocean strategy. The first four principles address blue ocean strategy formulation. 
The remaining two principles address the execution risks of blue ocean strategy.  
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Figure 2.   Blue Ocean Strategy Principles (After Kim & Mauborgne, 2005)  
While actionable intelligence is necessary for situational awareness of ongoing 
incidents, “the fire department needs timely and reliable information about preventive 
measures that other agencies, disciplines, and levels of government have taken, or plan to 
take” (DHS, 2008, p. 20).” In this context, it becomes imperative that the fire service 
develop a machinery to meet this need.  Without this information, EFOs will continue to 
make decisions in isolation and perpetuate the adage that HLS leaders operate in silos. 
By developing the machinery to bilaterally communicate intelligence at the local 
level, major urban fire departments will automatically forge relationships necessary to 
stay informed about decisions by homeland security partners that could affect service 
delivery.  Law enforcement is more conversant with intelligence principles and practices, 
so they would be a natural resource for training, assisting in policy development, and 
providing support to fire departments with methods for identifying and reporting terrorist 
activities.  Likewise, understanding that the fire service has unique intelligence needs and 
adopting initiatives to support them provides law enforcement an opportunity to develop 
public trust and enhance public safety. 
While  intelligence collaboration is readily apparent to participants in federal 
work groups and task forces, urban fire departments need more convincing that an 
exclusively top-down approach or federal mandate. Although the FSIE has defined 
several important documents that present best practices, each fire department or network 
of departments needs the benefit of a strategy designed by the local and regional partners 
who will have to implement such a strategy.  The essential difference that this approach 
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offers is in giving frontline fire fighters a more obvious connection to immediate benefits 
in expanded capabilities and some kind of yardstick that allows them to gauge progress in 
attaining such capacity.   
Additionally, because major urban fire departments make better terror targets 
based on urban population density, location of financial markets, and availability of 
critical infrastructure hubs in urban centers, the urban departments should assume the 
lead for smaller and volunteer departments within their region.  When taking a top-down 
approach as the FSIE, at times it seems as though the concepts created by the work group 
have a tendency to get watered down once the drafts have run through several federal 
stakeholders and the volunteer core of the fire service.  As a result, what may look good 
on paper proves difficult to implement, particularly if there is limited buy-in or support 
from local stakeholders. 
In comparison, an organization founded on principles described in the book 
Starfish and the Spider, would have a flat hierarchy; it would be void of a formal 
structure, and have decentralized decision-making (Brafman & Beckstom, 2006). As 
aforementioned, the authors Brafman and Beckstrom use the analogy of a starfish and a 
spider to illuminate how decentralized organizations often thrive without formal 
leadership or a “head” in comparison to a centralized organization that cannot function 
without its formal leader (2006).   
The success of a decentralized organization is predicated on the theory that there 
are five legs to support it, and losing one of its appendages will not undermine its 
existence (Brafman & Beckstom, 2006 p. 87).  Furthermore, when all five of the legs are 
operational, a decentralized organization will promote autonomous creativity, which is a 
force multiplier for innovation.  The five keys that make up a starfish organization are 
circles, a catalyst, champions, ideology, and pre-existing networks.   
The independent and autonomous nature of circles, which are without hierarchy 
and structure, remains an important aspect of decentralized organizations (Brafman & 
Beckstom, 2006, p. 90).  Once someone has gained membership everyone is an equal, 
and this aspect motivates members to contribute to the best of their abilities.  This unique 
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relationship in turn leads to trust and self-enforcement that then become the norms of the 
circle (Brafman & Beckstom, p. 90).  When members are physically connected, their 
bond provides a sense of accountability not found with virtual relationships.  The caveat 
to this theoretical model when compared to the fire service is that, as with any holistic 
construct, the fire service has historically shared a strong fraternal bond with other 
firefighters regardless of proximity.  This bodes well for the advancement of 
incorporating intelligence functions sporadically at the local level or in an ad hoc manner. 
Critical to a decentralized organization is the role of a catalyst.  Characteristics of 
catalysts are that they typically initiate a circle and then fade out of a lead position and 
allow the members of the circle to control its outcome. An important aspect of this 
movement is that by foregoing the leadership role, ownership and responsibility shifts to 
the rest of the group (Brafman & Beckstom, 2006, p. 93).  Catalysts for the fire service 
could be members who currently participate in local, state or regional fusion centers and 
share their stories that illustrate how others can gain momentum in this arena.  
The driving force behind circles is the ideology of the open system (Brafman & 
Beckstom, 2006, p. 94).  Freedom and trust are important, but the authors contend that 
without ideology, a decentralized organization would fail.  The influence of ideology to a 
circle is that members are motivated by the desire to create a better product, and the 
resulting openness or mutual respect of the group is key to the sustainment and 
recruitment of new members (Brafman & Beckstom, p. 96).  The ideology of intelligence 
in the fire service is quite possibly the most obvious barrier to this emergent issue.  The 
fire service is essentially at a standstill until its leaders fully embrace and prioritize 
integration toward the first preventer motif. 
The fourth leg in the starfish metaphor is the pre-existing network found in most 
successful decentralized organizations (Brafman & Beckstom, 2006, p. 97).  Though 
entry into preexisting networks can be challenging, an established circle of members is in 
a better position to promote a decentralized movement.  Moreover, the existing 
infrastructure of empowered members who have established personal connections is more 
open to innovation and will more readily take ownership of new ideas (Brafman & 
Beckstom, p. 97).  
 47
Every decentralized organization needs a champion.  A champion is one who is 
tenacious about the ideology and usually invests unlimited energy in advocating an idea 
or ideas. With this drive comes a relentless pursuit to “sell” the ideology when 
opportunity presents itself.  Unlike a catalyst that is charismatic and subtle in approach, 
champions visibly involve themselves in elevating their cause or organization to a new 
level (Brafman & Beckstom, 2006, pp. 99–100).  Champions for fire service intelligence 
are not readily found in the law enforcement community, so they must come from 
organizations like the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the International 
Association of Firefighters. 
1. Strategic Planning Hybrid  
Acknowledging that today’s homeland security landscape is fluid and dynamic, 
leaders should anticipate potentially dramatic circumstances that will require adapting 
corresponding strategies in response to cumulative changes in the environment (Bryson, 
2004, p. 299).  To accomplish change, leaders need to be in touch with their 
organizations so they can recognize if major strategic changes are necessary or focused 
energies should be better spent to improve existing plans (Bryson, 2004). 
As described earlier, the modern fire service has seen its responsibilities expand 
beyond the core functions of life safety and protecting property to those that encompass 
preparedness and planning to respond, mitigate and recover from acts of terrorism.  
Hence the need to adopt intelligence and information sharing functions to meet 
operational readiness.  Because fire departments act independently and each has unique 
characteristics, a hybrid strategy to overcome the barriers of implementing intelligence 
sharing would be the most productive option.  
How would a hybrid approach look?  It would be a network of fire departments 
interconnected virtually across the nation via clusters.  Locally, there would be local and 
regional partners who develop effective strategies to incorporate intelligence functions 
within their communities.  This partnership would establish the first leg, the regional 
circles.  Another leg would catalyze the relationship with local citizens via town meetings 
followed by a campaign of awareness to non-traditional communities.  The dialogue 
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would bode well for both the fire department and the municipality, but also to gain 
invaluable knowledge from the “edge of the network” through inclusion of the public in 
the process (Brafman & Beckstom, 2006, p. 171).  If firefighters do not make a unified 
effort to introduce the importance of this metamorphose, than public resistance may be 
overwhelming and essentially undermine their efforts. 
The inclusion of the fire service into the information/intelligence gathering and 
sharing framework will require shifting the current paradigm and culture of the 
department from its traditional role of “First Responder” toward the progressive role of 
“First Preventer” (DHS, 2008, p. 2) or even better, finding the balance of both of these 
roles.   
The support and commitment of key decision makers is critical to the 
development and implementation of strategic planning and change in an organization. 
The best time to identify these key individuals is in the planning stages, as they will be 
vital throughout the process.  The goal of strategic planning in the public sector is to 
support public value and advance the common good (Bryson, 2004, p. 335). See Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.   Power vs. Interest Grid (After Eden & Ackerman, 1998, p. 122)   
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Using the power vs. interest grid as tool, Executive Fire Officers can visually 
situate stakeholders on the grid based on two criteria: their level of interest in the 
organization, and their power to affect the organization's current status or, in some cases, 
future development. While stakeholders may have a high interest in fire service 
intelligence within their community, they may have low or little power to effect change. 
In the case of adopting intelligence functions in the fire service, several stakeholders who 
participated in the Delphi surveys noted that there are power/interest positions that must 
be taken into account, as shown in Figure 3. Neglecting their participation will undermine 
the efficacy of undertaking such a transformational process.   
Delphi survey results suggest that establishing coalitions early will lead to buy-in, 
a more robust product, and the kind of shared understanding of the benefits of the project 
that creates political capital which will make the difference between success and failure. 
As one Delphi respondent noted to achieve multi-disciplinary collaboration, “they 
[EFOs] can engage in projects that cross government to gain a familiarity (build 
relationships) with those who would be receiving the information the fire officer are 
discovering.” While another stated, “The public expects relationships, not lack of 
awareness or how we are going to collaborate.”  This transformation cannot happen if the 
leadership of the fire service does not embrace participating in the intelligence sharing 
enterprise.   
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V. INSTITUTIONALIZE FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE 
Inclusion of the fire service into the information and intelligence-sharing 
framework will be a complex and multifaceted transformation.  With the anticipated 
expansion of the fire service’s core mission to include these principles, it is imperative 
that EFOs be prepared to lead their respective departments into this unchartered territory.  
According to the National Strategy for Information Sharing incorporating 
counterterrorism strategies into fire departments’ policies, procedures and operating 
guidelines will enhance the nation’s security capabilities as “first preventers” and “first 
responders” (White House, 2007, p. 10). 
“One clear lesson of September 11 was the need to improve the sharing of 
information” (White House, 2007, p. 7).  Despite this notorious sentiment, some 
intelligence experts and law enforcement personnel still believe that intelligence 
operations are traditionally associated with law enforcement without need for non-
traditional partners. Given the researcher and Delphi respondents uncovered few 
documents supporting the expanding mission or core functions of the modern fire service, 
these beliefs may well extend beyond intelligence and law enforcement practitioners to 
the point of resonating equally well with EFOs. 
At the center of this issue is the proposition that the clash of cultures is fueled by 
a lack of understanding about each other’s mission and intelligence needs. While both 
fire and law enforcement responders are public servants, their missions dictate how they 
protect society. A comparison between their respective preventive strategies highlights 
this distinction.  The fire service employs preventive activities geared toward life safety 
via fire codes, fire prevention programs and pre-incident planning.  Law enforcement, 
however, relies on exercising police powers to prevent or deter criminal activity and civil 
unrest.  Firefighters enjoy warrantless inspection privileges21 to carry out fire prevention 
programs and, following fires, to investigate cause. Law enforcement officers investigate 
                                                 
21 In Sea v. the city of Seattle, firefighters conducting building inspections are acting as law 
enforcement officers and therefore must meet the same standard of warrants.  If a building owner denies 
Seattle Fire Department building entry, probable cause must be shown to a judge to secure an inspection 
warrant.  
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criminal activity for the purposes of prosecution with the intent of removing criminals 
from society and ultimately deterring future crimes.  To this end, police do not typically 
carry out warrantless searches because their impact on life safety is seldom so clear and 
immediate, whereas their potential impact on personal liberty is likely to be more severe. 
In an effort to research the integration of the homeland security mission into 
community policing, the Massachusetts Laws Enforcement Technology and Training 
Support Center merged police and firefighters with the desire to explore community 
information collection and sharing at the local level (Mitchell, Doherty, & Hibbard, 
2006).  The focus groups derived from the five homeland security regions were multi-
disciplinary and divided by chief executive and line-level responsibilities.  Most 
noteworthy were the emerging priorities: “training, approachability, promotion and 
outreach, communication and follow-up” (Mitchell et al., 2006).    
With training, the consensus was that multi-disciplinary efforts would reduce 
information gaps because “first responders need to know how to cultivate information: 
what information to look for, how to collect it and where to send it (Mitchell et al., 
2006)."  Similarly, the Delphi respondents overwhelming noted that a lack of 
understanding disciplinary missions is a recurring theme within the non-traditional 
framework of police and fire. As one Delphi member suggested, “[EFOs] need to 
encourage local and state fire service organizations to work with law/intel to show the 
benefit fire/EMS/hazmat brings to the intel impact that table.”  
A. THE FIRE SERVICE AS A CRITICAL PARTNER     
Most experts agree that approachability for members of the first responder 
community traces from historical relationships or past practices deemed as positive or 
negative, depending on the outcome.  Thus, the homeowner whose child was rescued 
before a kitchen fire killed all inhabitants thinks more highly of his local fire department 
than a woman who was mugged in a parking lot thinks of the police department which no 
longer has the resources to patrol such areas.  Beyond the community circumstances, the 
focus groups concluded that all first responder disciplines must be responsive to their 
communities beyond their respective scope of authority and find ways to manage 
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information if the expectation is “to integrate homeland security in every facet of 
community life” (Mitchell et al., 2006).  One suggestion articulated by a Delphi 
respondent noted, “The greatest impact that EFOs can have in improving their 
departments’ intelligence situational awareness is by establishing a relationship with their 
law enforcement partners.” This collaboration could equate to the integration of 
homeland security initiatives within a particular community when fire and law 
enforcement are true rather than theoretical partners. 
Notwithstanding, the fire service inherited a favorable relationship with the public 
community from its non-partisan reputation of helping all people in need, regardless of 
socio-economic, political, religious, or racial make-up. In the law enforcement arena, 
there lingers a popular perception that such factors influence the quality of response, 
regardless of whether such perceptions are valid or just assumed, with one critic 
suggesting, “In some cases, police officers reportedly have refused to take a complaint of 
a potential hate crime. Officers reportedly have trivialized incidents or stonewalled 
attempts to file complaints” (Amnesty International USA, n.d.).  Other analysts say, 
“First responders need to know how to cultivate information” (Mitchell et al., 2006) 
because it is during public interactions where firefighters have access and exposure to 
circumstances not experienced by law enforcement personnel. These opportunities if 
unrecognized can compromise the safety of first responders and ultimately the 
communities they serve.  
Despite the misconceptions of the ethical responsibility of fire service personnel 
to report suspicious activity, some in the media suggest that firefighters who participate 
in “information/intelligence sharing” programs similar to the pilot originated in the 
FDNY,22 would essentially be turning firefighters “into legally protected domestic spies” 
(Edwards & Muriel, 2007).  Adding to this distortion is the premise that fire service 
intelligence as seen by some EFOs, contradicts its core discipline and compromises the  
 
 
                                                 
22 FDNY is credited as the first urban fire department to formally train in terrorism awareness or the 
ability to recognize suspicious activities and implement internal and external conduits for dissemination. 
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fire service's ability to remain transparent rather than making departments safer and better 
prepared. In this context, the terms “fire service” and “intelligence” appear fundamentally 
incompatible.  
Likewise, “counterterrorism” is even further removed from fire fighter vernacular.  
EFOs concede that most fire fighters are not “hard-wired” to function in this capacity. 
Whether it is fear of the unknown or resistance to change, experts noted that word 
selection plays a role in user acceptance.  Specifically, if the word “counter” were 
exchanged with the word “prevention,” then fire service personnel would be more likely 
to adopt concepts of counterterrorism operations once recast as terrorism prevention 
(Martinez, 2006).  As noted by a chief of a major metropolitan fire department, 
“Regardless of what it is called, without the support of the law enforcement community, 
there will be no intelligence capabilities in the fire service” (confidential, personal 
communication September 24, 2009).  
However as promulgated by the National Intelligence Strategy of the United 
States of America, “the new concept of national intelligence was codified by the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act” (U.S. Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, 2005, p. 1) and the expectation is this is a shared responsibility.  
Consequently, Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 prescribed guidelines and requirements to support the creation and implementation 
of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE).  The premise was that the ISE would 
enhance the information exchanges based on full partnerships between “Federal 
departments and agencies, State, local and tribal governments, and private sector entities” 
(White House, 2007, p. 12).  Within the body of this strategy the concept of including 
nontraditional partners outside of the law enforcement community emerges as a key 
mandate. 
Additionally, an important aspect of the ISE is the recognition that the 
informational needs of State, local, and tribal entities expand as counterterrorism and 
homeland security activities are integrated into daily public safety missions.  To that end, 
the fire service has historically been a consumer of intelligence.  However, access to 
“timely, credible, and actionable information and intelligence,” (ISE Program Manager, 
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2006) has generally been slow or non-existent, despite the intelligence being crucial to 
public safety and to maintaining a fire department’s state of readiness.  The Information 
Sharing Environment sets forth the following vision as the desired end-state: 
A trusted partnership among all levels of government in the United States, 
the private sector, and our foreign partners, in order to detect, prevent, 
disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism against the territory, 
people, and interests of the United States by the effective and efficient 
sharing of terrorism and homeland security information. (ISE Program 
Manager, 2006) 
Furthermore, most EFOs accept as falling within their core disciplines the current 
DHS claim that the fire service is a critical partner in the efforts to secure the homeland.  
After all, securing the homeland is consistent with the traditional fire service role of 
saving lives and property.  However, there is no such consensus when it comes to 
labeling the fire service as a homeland security partner in terrorism prevention.  Whether 
it is a question of intelligence gathering by firefighters or sharing of such intelligence 
with law enforcement and other new partners, there remain more divergent opinions than 
agreement among front-line firefighters, EFOs, and their law enforcement counterparts.   
As noted by the Delphi research group:  
The fire service wants to maintain operational readiness by keeping 
abreast of intel and passing this information to its firefighters. The IC 
wants to keep this information confidential so as not to compromise the 
integrity of the data. Sometimes, conflicts arise because of this lack of 
information sharing which results in a breakdown of trust between 
agencies.   
A different perspective was “some firefighters can be the poison pill for these 
programs, as they do not believe it is part of the fire service mission.” Notwithstanding, 
there is room for debate on the parameters of such a transformation as well as the issue 
that integration of intelligence duties is by no means a one-size-fits-all strategy.  
However, legislative, regulatory and legal context exist to move forward with the 
transition for “First Responders” toward becoming “First Preventers.”23   
                                                 
23 This assessment is based on Figure 1: Legislative, Regulatory, and Legal Context for FSIE listing 
the instruments (DHS, 2008, p. 5). 
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Although the IC will continue in its’ role as the primary source for information 
related to terrorist plans, intentions and tactics, it is imperative that there is a framework 
to share critical information related to individuals and groups who intend to conduct 
terrorist activities within the United States (White House, 2007, p. 10).  In the interval, 
information and intelligence conduits should be developed, and established within local 
fire departments and expanding out, between law enforcement agencies.  Following this 
evolution, as a critical byproduct, non-traditional partners and stakeholders will be folded 
into the framework.  
Defining intelligence for the fire service would further enhance the structure and 
organizing principles that will support a network of firefighters who promote sharing 
intelligence when they all speak the same language.  While this effort appears to be 
global, major urban fire departments need to establish a working machinery so that they 
can incorporate outlining departments.   
The preferred terminology within the fire service is information sharing rather 
than intelligence sharing, as police intelligence carries law enforcement overtones that 
enforce divergent impressions across the public safety arena. Likewise, counterterrorism 
efforts have historically been law enforcement-centric and certainly far removed from 
most firefighters’ purview.  
While each fire department has a unique relationship with its law enforcement 
partners, these examples underscore the evolutionary process of holistically adapting to 
the current threats shared across disciplines, jurisdications and all levels of government.  
As noted by the Delphi research group, policy makers and elected officials should 
support these collaborative initiatives by expanding participation at the department level 
and through DHS led fusion centers.   
One option is the use of suspicious activity reporting, provided law enforcement 
and fire officials develop a legally acceptable means for firefighters to assist their law 
enforcement partners with information.  On the surface, supplying information that 
firefighters accumulate in the course of normal activities appears a straightforward 
undertaking.  In practice, however, as Delphi respondents pointed out, such sharing tends 
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to be unidirectional, with little police feedback returning on how the firefighter 
information was used or whether it was even received.  As noted from a chief with 
extensive national deployment experience, “nor do many fire departments receive even 
sketchy details regarding outcomes.”  As a result, EFOs have no way to gauge the 
effectiveness of their intelligence sharing efforts or whether their investments in such 
efforts are yielding dividends to their communities.  Again, this validates the need for a 
working framework and mechanism to gather and share information, as well as the 
dissemination of intelligence to firefighters that is timely, tailored, digestible and clear 
(Lowenthal, 2006, p. 139). 
To expand on this theory, the National Strategy for Information Sharing describes 
its vision for the nation and identifies guiding principles to assist first responders: 
Those responsible for combating terrorism must have access to timely and 
accurate information regarding those who want to attack us, their plans 
and activities, and the targets that they intend to attack. (White House, 
2007, p. 2)  
There have been modest attempts to integerate intelligence functions into the fire 
service. Most efforts support sharing across agencies rather than between fire department.  
In effect, if there is a mechanism for sharing intelligence, it is more likely that a 
firefighter will be providing the details to a police counterpart than to another fire 
department in the next city or county.    
B. FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE     
In September 2007, 15 fire department leaders met with officials from the 
Department of Homeland Security at the inaugural information-sharing conference where 
Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Charles Allen said, “You are truly at the 
front line—at the vanguard of all relief efforts” (FDNY News, 2007, p. 7).  Having the 
Assistant Secretary address the fire service drew attention to the ongoing need for 
information or intelligence sharing as an area ripe for EFO attention.  
This conference launched efforts geared toward identifying fire service 
requirements of intelligence products.  Ultimately, the conference set into motion events 
that would culminate with the creation of the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise. 
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Initially, the FSIE was developed by the fire service for the fire service (DHS, 2008, p. 
4). To their credit, the members of the FSIE took a bottom-up approach to develop a 
common vision, including a governance structure, information requirements, and training 
needs.   
To formulate the National Strategy for Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise, a 
workgroup was established as a collaborative process that included 15 major urban fire 
departments. Although the workgroup addressed the integration of federal, state, and 
local intelligence partners, most fire participants believed that the outcome would also 
support internal sharing within the fire service (anonymous personal communication 
March 6, 2009).  Regardless, the first priority was to formulate a strategy to fill this 
deficit followed by integration of non-traditional initiatives that support collaboration and 
situational awareness.  
These networks would start as local forums and expand regionally, then 
nationally.  The working group began by focusing on first establishing intelligence for 
internal, fire service use. Though the fire service has yet to make its mark in intelligence 
within the broader context of homeland security partnerships, the FSIE framework offers 
a starting point for such efforts. This foundation supplies “the ability to prioritize and 
disseminate threat-relevant information across agencies and disciplines” (Royal, 
Donahue, & Aiden, 2008, p. 54) that needs to transition to the forefront of the emergency 
response community.  Given that the fire service intelligence work group consists of 
leaders well versed in the conceptual aspects of intelligence operations, relying on this 
group to champion adoption of FSIE would be a logical step in the evolution to 
integrating the intelligence role into the core disciplines of the fire service.   
Lastly, as noted in the National Strategy for the Fire Service Intelligence 
Enterprise (FSIE) there is national precedent to embody these concepts. “By leveraging 
existing and emerging homeland security capabilities and structure, including fusion 
centers, Fire Service personnel will more effectively prevent, prepare, respond and 




2).  As leaders recognize the importance of their expanded fire service responsibilities, it 
will be imperative that elected officials be kept in the loop and educated on the 
parameters of these initiatives as they mature. 
C. INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT AND COORDINATION 
GROUP     
By putting information within the grasp of the fire service, new resources show 
promising potential for accelerating the paradigm shift to embrace intelligence as a core 
duty. The Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) 24 recently 
produced Intelligence Guide for First Responders, a tool that outlines Federal 
counterintelligence, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction intelligence 
reporting (Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group [ITACG], 2009, p. 2).  
The handbook provides a general overview of what intelligence is and how to deal with 
intelligence issues.  It concludes with a reference section that deciphers Intelligence 
Community terminology, acronyms and abbreviations.  
The handbook is full of information that would serve as an immediate resource 
for EFOs who have minimal exposure to intelligence nomenclature or lack a basic 
understanding of its core functions.  For example, the extensive resource list of 
Intelligence Products Typically Available to First Responders and Understanding Threat 
Information supply reference and tutorial details that would otherwise be inaccessible to 
the average firefighter (ITACG, 2009, pp. 29, 42). 
There are several examples across the nation of fire departments producing 
unclassified and open source intelligence briefings or contributing to local and regional 
intelligence briefings. Most are “For Official Use Only” (FOUO), “Law Enforcement 
Sensitive” (LES) and a select few use the term “Fire/Rescue Sensitive” (FRS). They vary 
in size, design and content, as they are tailored to the jurisdiction served while providing 
the larger fire service with actionable intelligence on local and national threats. 
                                                 
24 The ITACG consists of state, local, and tribal first responders and federal intelligence analysts from 
the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, working at the National 
Counterterrorism Center to enhance the sharing of federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and 
weapons of mass destruction information with state, local, and tribal consumers of intelligence. 
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According to an open source author/contributor, readership continues to expand as these 
documents reach multi-disciplinary audiences beyond the fire service (anonymous, 
personal communication July 7, 2009). 
Another positive effort to indoctrinate the fire service into the intelligence culture 
is the recent assignment of a fire representative into the Department of Homeland 
Security’s National Operations Center (Pitts, 2008).  In fact, April 2006 information 
sharing discussions between the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the U.S. Fire 
Administration predated the FSIE rollout, by well over a year, as noted in Fire Chief 
Magazine (Pitts, 2008)  
As research and foundational literature has established, intelligence as a new 
discipline remains foreign to the fire service.  By the same token, casting certain aspects 
of intelligence in familiar fire service terms, such as situational awareness, pre-fire or 
size-up, renders aspects of intelligence accessible to any firefighter. Avoiding the 
needless complexity of magnifying artificial distinctions between information and 
intelligence is another way of making the new role more accessible.  One prominent 
intelligence expert asserts “all intelligence is information; not all information is 
intelligence” (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 2).  Thus, for the fire service, it would appear useful to 
begin with the more familiar terms, such as information, and then build on the familiar to 
gradually introduce the more arcane versions of these terms, such as those noted in the 
National Strategy for the Fire Service Enterprise.  
D. MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH—FUSION CENTERS 
The 9/11 Commission concluded that during the plotting stages, there was a 
disconnect between domestic and foreign intelligence leading up to the terrorist attack on 
September 11 (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 263). Although there have been no 
comparably spectacular attacks on U.S. soil since 9/11, experts suggest that terrorism 
remains a legitimate threat (ITACG, 2009).   
While the current threat environment has broad implications for most urban fire 
departments, clearly this analysis should provoke urban metropolitan fire departments to 
evaluate internal and external policies and strategic initiatives that would support 
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collaboration. Moreover, developing multi-disciplinary and multi-agency relationships 
can solidify a formal machinery for actionable intelligence. This type of planning 
requires participation by all response agencies, resulting in a force-multiplier effect that 
contributes to a jurisdiction's overall effectiveness in terrorism prevention and emergency 
response (Pollard, Powell, Royal, Tuohy, & Boyd-Shaw, 2005).  In addition, given that 
multiple agencies will respond to terrorism, it is imperative to address any statutory 
authority that can influence operational considerations in advance of an actual incident 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2001, pp. 4-3).  In other words, the 
time to determine who is in charge of what is before the casualties and the destruction. 
Fusion centers are a logical step in furthering collaboration between law 
enforcement and fire, providing participation is mutual.  Many of the current fusion 
centers originated from state-funded, criminal intelligence task forces and remain 
dominated by law enforcement. While the trend is to shift towards an all-crimes or all-
hazards approach, a recent report prepared for Congress indicated less than 15 percent of 
surveyed fusion centers remain solely focused on counterterrorism (Rollins, 2008, p. 21). 
Slightly more than 40 percent of the surveyed fusion centers pursue a less than definitive 
“all-crimes” mission compared to the 40 percent that have adopted an all-hazards mission 
and the greatest variation in interpretation of what the all-hazards definition means 
(Rollins, 2008, p. 21). Despite the inconsistency, those with an all-hazards emphasis were 
more likely to include non-law enforcement personnel than their counterterrorism or all-
crimes partners (Rollins, 2008, p. 36).  
At a National Fusion Center Conference in Kansas City, Secretary Janet 
Napolitano conveyed her philosophy of fusion centers as a “collaborative space” where 
information can be shared “across disparate disciplines, law enforcement, fire, public 
health, emergency management and critical infrastructure protection” (DHS, 2009).  The 
Secretary challenged the attendees—predominantly law enforcement—to question the 
diversity of their fusion centers when she asked, “Who is in your fusion center?”  Most 
importantly, the Secretary articulated that fusion centers should be “a seamless network 
of information sharing...not just vertically but horizontally across the country at different 
levels” (DHS, 2009).   
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Because fusion centers conceptually epitomize the function of synthesizing 
information/intelligence in multi-disciplinary environments, the fire service should 
capitalize on available opportunities to understand the structure and operations of the 
state, local fusion center within its jurisdictions.  By integrating with law enforcement, 
the fire service stays informed about decisions that could affect its service delivery. 
Without proper representation or involvement, it is questionable that these fusion centers 
can meet the intelligence needs of the fire service or protect their communities.  
There are several other benefits from participating in the fusion and information 
sharing process.  Fire departments can adapt response capability based on the identified 
need.  Additionally, equipment procurement and the development of training programs 
and curricula can be tailored to emerging threats. At the same time, coordination and 
collaboration with other public safety agencies provides invaluable experience.  In 
addition, the integration with law enforcement will support a variety of mandates called 
for in most local or regional grant funding from the Urban Area Security Initiative 
(UASI).25 
EFOs facing tight budgets and competing demands for their resources need 
reassurance that any investment they make in supporting fusion centers will produce a 
meaningful return.  For this reason, in some municipalities, fusion center directors may 
find that they need to demonstrate their value before calling for fire service support. 
Recommended demonstrations of value include delivering terrorism awareness training 
and addressing community concerns of privacy, respect for civil liberties, and the legal 
boundaries that prohibit firefighters from assuming police functions.  Moreover, to 
support fusion center intelligence, firefighters need standard training on pre-attack 
indicators and protocols for suspicious activity reporting that also takes into account due 
regard for civil liberties.  
The fire service has developed longstanding relationships with its communities, 
resulting in routine firefighter access to a broad array of information whose terrorism 
                                                 
25 The Urban Area Security Initiative is intended to help meet homeland security needs by providing 
resources to select urban areas for planning, equipment, training, exercises and program management and 
information.  
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prevention significance will be lost in the absence of training.  Thus, if certain pre-attack 
indicators known to local police do not reach the firefighters who are more likely to spot 
such indicators in the course of their routine work, this failure to share information will 
result in a cascading failure to collect and share intelligence  Once law enforcement 
partners recognize this challenge, their cultural resistance to involving firefighters in a 
shared understanding of indicators should give way to the greater intelligence benefit of 
maximizing the firefighter's “important ability to act as a natural surveillance and 
detection system” (Royal et al., 2008, p. 15).  
The fire service's dilemma is to reconcile two opposing mandates:  contributing to 
intelligence that will defend communities while, at the same time, preserving a 
relationship of trust whereby community members instinctively give access to private 
dwellings and businesses out of the belief that firefighters are there to protect life and 
property.  As EFOs indicated in their deliberations, navigating through this dilemma is 
best done from the vantage of a heightened awareness that does not question the primary 
firefighter obligations but, instead, clearly makes intelligence gathering an ancillary duty. 
Otherwise, with the primary mission in question or in tatters, firefighters stand to lose 
their moorings and to risk performing well in one area only at the expense of another.  An 
important element of this training is the credibility made possible through joint delivery 
by police and their fire service liaison officers. This joint effort can be the basis for 
continued multi-disciplinary awareness training and collaborative campaigns.  The 
readily identifiable dividend that such campaigns offer is enhancement of operational 
readiness in the face of terrorist tactics and anticipated attacks.   
Another emerging issue for non-traditional partners’ involvement in the fusion 
process is access to classified information.  In many ways, the fire service joins local 
police in experiencing frustration from not being recognized and supported as a recipient 
of information classified for reasons of national security.  Indeed, non-federal, non-
traditional partners routinely report encountering systemic over-classification of 
intelligence, which perpetuates a lack of dissemination to those who need it most (9/11 
Commission, 2004, pp. 417–418). 
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While clearances remain elusive, it is common perception in the fire service that 
within the law enforcement community, there are systemic barriers to inclusion.  EFOs 
do not need to know specifics that could compromise an active investigation, such as 
identities, details of plots, and rendezvous sites of suspected terrorists. They do need to 
know tactical information, such as threats to the public or target locations, because the 
fire service cannot establish well-grounded strategic objectives and make tactical 
decisions without accurate, actionable and critical information.  
Moreover, the department has a legitimate role in collecting and developing all-
source situational awareness in cooperation with a multitude of response agencies.  To do 
this requires the integration of firefighters into the intelligence/information-sharing 
framework. According to a report by the Markle Foundation Taskforce, “It is about 
establishing a collaborative environment with a clear purpose: ensuring that the right 
people have access to the right information at the right time under the right conditions to 
enable the most informed decisions (2009, p. 3).   
Therefore, the value added by a department’s commitment to the fusion process is 
at minimum threefold.  First, participation will ensure that critical communication occurs 
while providing pre-incident coordination with law enforcement.  Second, by sharing 
information with non-traditional partners in every direction, the department will enhance 
safety and security while remaining committed to its core functions and mission.  Third, 
leadership can strategically leverage resources toward preparation and response 
capabilities.  
As the threat of terrorism remains viable, the fire service must adapt to maintain 
the highest state of operational readiness.  Rather than becoming a lessons learned 
example following a catastrophic failure, this is the fire service's opportunity to 
participate in the larger homeland security objective of preventing death and destruction.  
Experts suggest that information that will protect our country will come from the ground 
up, rather than from the top down.  Hence, the criticality of integrating the fire service 
into state and local fusion centers.  
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1. Balancing Civil Liberties With the Duty to Act   
Because fusion centers are led by law enforcement agencies, most of their policy 
guidance betrays a policing slant.  While the fire service lacks as much internal capacity 
to deal with intelligence as law enforcement, it nevertheless integrates with difficulty into 
fusion centers if a law enforcement-centric focus leaves scant room for factoring in other 
partners' equities.  Recognizing this problem, The Fusion Center Guidelines—Developing 
and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era highlighted one such 
requirement: 
In order to balance law enforcement’s ability to share information with the 
rights of citizens, appropriate privacy and civil liberties polices must be in 
place.  Privacy and civil liberties protection should be considered in the 
planning stages of a fusion center. (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 
41) 
Based on national statistics, firefighters gain entry to private residences to deal 
with medical emergencies more often than fire-related emergencies.26  Given the 
personal nature of a medical emergency, abuse of this access has the greatest potential for 
both confusion and controversy.  Clearly there is the potential for patients or citizens to 
confuse the priorities of EMS responders, if they believe that their personal medical 
information may be arbitrarily or unnecessarily revealed to law enforcement.  To counter 
this misunderstanding, it is EFOs responsibility to maintain public trust by assuring the 
community that firefighters are well trained and committed to respecting their rights and 
privacy. 
One approach to attaining a better understanding of the challenge that firefighters 
deal with in their stewardship of the public trust is to look for insights into how a family 
physician would have to deal with the same kind of private information.  In the case of 
emergency medicine, legal guidance exists as a result of the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).  HIPAA mandated standards to protect 
individually identifiable health information in any form (Office of Civil Rights, 2003, p. 
3). As part of HIPAA’s Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
                                                 
26 According to the United States Fire Association, 50–80 percent of a fire departments emergency 
responses are emergency medical services calls (2008). 
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Information, also known as the HIPAA Privacy Rules, there exist strict provisions to 
deter unauthorized disclosure of the equivalent of private information as it applies to 
medical data (2003, p. 3).   
Where does HIPAA offer applicable insights for the fire service in its aim to 
avoid inappropriate disclosure of private information given in trust?  HIPAA deals at 
length with this issue in the section dealing with essential government functions.  This 
section calls out circumstances authorizing disclosure and release of medical information 
specialized government functions (Office of Civil Rights, 2003, p. 8).  Specifically, 
HIPAA permits the disclosure of protected health information to authorized federal 
officials for the conduct of lawful intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other national 
security activities authorized by the National Security Act (50 U.S.C. 401, et seq.) and 
similar implementing authority (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 45, Section 
164.512(2), 2002).  Consequently, if the medical community can find a means of 
navigating through restrictive laws protecting the most private of personal information, 
the fire service should also be able to do the same without jeopardizing its community 
standing any more than a doctor does by following HIPAA guidelines.  
While most urban fire departments have formal policies to address the federal 
HIPAA regulations, where they may fall short is when developing policies for 
intelligence gathering if they neglect to incorporate state confidentiality laws.  Experts 
suggest that laws affecting medical confidentiality and disclosure offer a model for fusion 
centers to use.  In some cases, state laws are more restrictive and prohibit the reporting of 
such protected information, even if the data may reveal potential terrorist planning or 
operations (Petrie, 2007, p. 10). 
Beyond the implications for protected medical information, opposition exists to 
any use of firefighters as intelligence collectors, particularly within the ranks of the 
American Civil Liberties Union who have publically campaigned against this role of the 
fire service.  Retired Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) intelligence analyst and 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) attorney, Mike German, claimed “Americans 
universally abhorred that idea” (Sullivan, 2007).  During a nationally televised interview, 
he voiced these same concerns when discussing the merits of firefighters providing 
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information on suspicious materials and behaviors detected in the course of fire 
inspections and medical emergencies (Edward & Kane, 2007).  He coauthored the 
ACLU’s position paper, “What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?” which outlined a variety 
of concerns about transparency and inconsistencies with design and accountability 
between each fusion center (German & Stanley, 2007).  
While none of German’s dire predictions have come to pass, the attention these 
concerns have received may account for the fire service’s reluctance to fully engage in 
the intelligence arena.  If communities no longer trust their fire departments because they 
feel that firefighters are feeding private information to local police, they risk alienating 
their customers (i.e., the very communities which will demand redress from government 
policymakers) (Petrie, 2007, pp. 4-6). Worse still, the alienated public may stop calling 9-
1-1 and refuse to cooperate with firefighters during life-threatening emergencies.   
Within the Delphi group, many respondents voiced concerns about this 
relationship and its effects on strategies.  One SME commented that “fear of public 
perception regarding fire department participation in intelligence activities,” is a primary 
cause preventing EFOs from pursuing fire service intelligence initiatives.  Another 
suggested, “The public needs to have confidence that when they call 911 that they will 
receive the best service delivery available.”  In any case, community trust is a privilege 
that has taken decades to establish while one misunderstood action could jeopardize this 
longstanding relationship.  Rather than testing the fragility of public trust, it is incumbent 
on the fire service to be proactive through policy development and formal training before 
it finds itself in an untenable position.  
2. Fusion Liaison Officer 
As aforementioned, the FSIE strategy reminds us that “the fire department needs 
timely and reliable information about preventive measures that other agencies, 
disciplines, and levels of government have taken, or plan to take” (DHS, 2008, p. 20).  It 
would be difficult to participate at one spectrum of actionable intelligence without 
incorporating aspects to contribute information to local partners. That said, the Terrorism 
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Liaison Officer (TLO) and the Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) programs represent other 
viable options for collaborating and integrating into the state, local fusion centers.  
An FLO is a designated representative from a law enforcement agency, fire 
service, or public safety organization who is responsible for coordinating terrorist and 
other criminal intelligence information between the parent organization and the local 
fusion center.  A TLO is similarly assigned lead coordination responsibilities, but may 
not necessarily be based out of the fusion center.  FLOs and TLOs provide information 
directly to the fusion center, and facilitate vital information sharing between fire 
departments and fusion centers (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009, p. 3).  By developing a 
core group of firefighters as liaison officers, a department would nurture relationships 
and drive collaboration with stakeholders participating in the fusion center.   
The need for formal training goes beyond the fire service. A recent functional 
exercise testing a broad spectrum of terrorism prevention capabilities revealed a shortage 
of police officers trained to manage counterterrorism and criminal intelligence cases 
(DHS, 2008).  One of the lessons from this exercise was that law enforcement agencies 
should designate and train one representative in intelligence sharing. However, the report 
omits recommending whether this officer should be full-time or part-time (DHS, 2008).  
With the necessity to share information/intelligence, homeland security leaders in 
law enforcement have come to rely on creating liaison officers as focal points to work 
with homeland security partners.  As the foregoing exercise and related report emphasize, 
a substantial benefit for the fire service may well come from developing its own liaison 
officers and maximizing their value by enrolling them in a formal training program 
tailored to the service’s needs.  
Although this program is in the conceptual stage in most major urban areas, there 
are several examples of firefighters trained and performing in both the TLO and FLO 
capacity across the country in formal and ad-hoc capacities via fusion centers.  Some 
departments staff this position full-time on a rotational basis, while others rely on a cadre 
of firefighters who participate in quarterly meetings and then provide briefings to their 
department executives.   
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Some participate in their local Joint Terrorism Task Forces operated by the FBI. 
However, the researcher was unable to acquire empirical information due to the lack of a 
formal database to query for such data.27  The Colorado Information Analysis Center has 
a network of Terrorism Liaison Officers that includes firefighters (DHS, 2008).  These 
examples demonstrate that TLO/FLO programs offer benefits to the fire service and their 
successful integration could serve as the basis for incorporating this position in major 
urban fire departments.  
At the tactical level, EFOs recognize significant incidents require ongoing 
assessments to support situational awareness.  However, foreknowledge is even more 
valuable and can make the difference between a well-planned and executed response or a 
chaotic and complex response that exposes both responders and citizens to unnecessary 
risk.  Accomplishing the transformation toward integrating fire service intelligence 
begins by developing internal capabilities to identify suspicious activity that contribute to 
situational awareness and, by extension, to preventing terrorist attacks.  With established 
terrorism or fusion liaisons, a department is then poised to understand the real-time threat 
picture related to its municipality.  Moreover, “thoughtful analysis about risks to our 
communities supports elected officials and homeland security leaders...to better utilize 
limited financial resources to make effective, risk-based decisions about public safety 
matters and mitigate threats to the homeland” (Riegle, 2009).   
E. CRISIS INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Lessons learned from September 11 demonstrate the value of implementing 
incident command and streamlining interagency collaboration through timely sharing of 
intelligence, as opposed to adhering to traditional routines that leave responders to work 
in isolation.  Institutionalizing this change requires developing relationships, 
incorporating best practices, and leveraging innovative technology to facilitate 
intelligence sharing.   
                                                 
27 Through personnel contacts, the researcher was able to confirm that there are fire service members 
who are in contact with both fusion centers and the JTTF in ad hoc or informal capacities.  
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To remedy systemic failures of 9/11, the creation of the DHS was to serve as a 
catalyst for infusing the emergency response architecture with vital situational awareness. 
Subsequently, several Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) supplied 
guidance to lead the public safety sector in the direction of a unity of effort that prevents, 
preempts, or interdicts terrorist attacks. To meet the intent of HSPD 528 and HSPD 829, 
public safety leaders were called to redefine existing roles and responsibilities to define 
groundbreaking advances in interagency cooperation.  
Through the lens of a first preventer, these HSPDs provide the means of 
introducing technology to expedite intelligence sharing.  Given that, the fire service had 
adopted elements of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) decades ago, 
most EFOs are well versed in the application of incident management.  Where they have 
limited exposure is in making the most of technology to share intelligence rapidly and 
connect with other responders.  Effective incident management dictates that it is critical 
to generate a common picture of the operational environment (i.e., a shared situational 
awareness).  
Fortunately, the fire service need not invent technological solutions when others 
are already developing and testing them.  For example, the Crisis Information 
Management System (CIMS) shows promise as a means of gathering up inputs from 
geographically separated units, consolidating them for analytical review, and then 
broadcasting analysis based on all the inputs to end-users via whatever means is at the 
recipient's disposal (Security Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, 2004, p. 2).  
In theory, CIMS should be able to push out the same, real-time intelligence to one 
responder on a cellular telephone, to another on a mobile data terminal, and to yet another 
on an agency radio. 
                                                 
28Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), the management of Domestic Incidents, directed the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS) (White 
House, 2003).  The purpose of NIMS is to augment emergency responders’ capabilities to prepare for, 
prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorism and man-made or natural disasters using a “single, 
comprehensive approach to domestic incident management” (White House, 2003).   
29 HSPD-8 addresses National Preparedness and established policies to strengthen the level of 
preparedness to “prevent and respond” to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters and 
established mechanisms for efficient delivery of Federal assistance” (White House, 2003, p. 1). 
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Initially, the most common application for CIMS was limited to emergency 
operation centers (EOCs) where it supported the management of crisis information. 
Additionally, EOC managers and staff use CIMS to capture and display situation status 
and resource status updates and as a tool to document incident events (U.S. Department 
of Justice, 2002, p. 1).  A number of expert commissions and the first responder 
community made recommendations suggesting that spreading the use of technology 
would significantly improve incident management and enhance terrorism response 
(Institute for Security Technology Studies, 2004, p. 5).  
In order for innovations like CIMS to gain traction in the fire service, they must 
deliver immediate benefits in both emergency and routine situations.  A firefighter taking 
the time to learn the new system must be able to recognize its value as an incident 
management tool that aligns with Incident Command System (ICS) functions.  However, 
if the only opportunity to use CIMS is under emergency conditions, the tool will rust in 
its scabbard.  Thus it must also offer utility as a planning tool in day-to-day operations, or 
it will not be used enough to be valued.  A way of improving the tool's perceived value is 
to enlist it as an information-sharing conduit for linking with the local law enforcement 
and other local stakeholders or partners.  Today, commercial software developers 
regularly customize applications to meet the demands of first responders. With these 
technological advances, the fire service has the opportunity to evaluate or even demand 
several products to improve situational awareness while enhancing command and control 
capabilities. 
Selection of any technology should be a collaborative effort that includes the end 
user, the technical support staff, and the developer,  Most importantly, though, the fire 
service end user should enter into this arena with a well thought-out conceptual idea of 
what problem the technology is to solve.   To assist in the selection of a CIMS product, 
the CISM Test Bed Project developed Guidelines30 and created the Feature Comparison 
Matrix Tool (FCMT)31.  Both the guidelines and a matrix tool were based on surveys 
                                                 
30 See Appendix A – Critical Information Management Systems Guidelines. 
31 The Feature Comparison Matrix Tool is available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/temp/publications/197065-Matrix.zip. 
 72
from emergency management agencies to compare and contrast commercially available 
software in an unbiased trial. In addition, the FCMT was designed to augment the 
procurement process by evaluating common functions and assigning a weighted score 
based on internal agency requirements (U.S. Department of Justice, 2002, p. 8).   
Interoperability presents a challenge because different application developers 
have proprietary interests that inhibit sharing of trade secrets that keep them in business.  
Again, the fire service need not tackle this challenge on its own.  Instead, EFOs may look 
to the Emergency Interoperability Consortium (EIC), which was launched in October 
2002.  As posted on the EICs homepage, their objectives are to create a nationwide 
standard for data sharing through a public/private effort, to encourage web-based services 
to support the exchange of information during emergency incidents and make appropriate 
information available to the public for use in the development process (EIC Organization, 
2008).  Key to this effort is that the EIC requires open sharing of information between 
different applications (Security Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, 2004). 
Other government agencies and initiatives also offer promise in addressing these 
challenges.  For example, DHS itself developed the Disaster Management (DM) 
Standards Initiative.  This initiative aims to enhance cross-jurisdictional collaborations 
despite the likely possibility that responder agencies are using different software, 
systems, and devices (Security Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, 2004, p. 2).  
Conceptually, the “DM and EIC work together to demonstrate standards and expedite 
adoption in vendor products—making them available to end users as quickly as possible” 
(Security Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, 2004, p. 2). 
The CIMS selection process identifies plausible answers to the question, “How 
can situational awareness, intelligence sharing, and implementation of the Incident 
Command System be enhanced with the inclusion of technology?”  An application that 
then follows the CIMS evaluation process should be selected if it fulfills the department's 
communication, situational awareness, and data management needs.  Such a tool will 
generate automated incident plans and ICS forms.  It can also link documents and 
resources together in a way that saves time and manual labor.  These features allow a fire  
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department to use the application daily for a multitude of business processes in the fire 
prevention bureau,32 where oversight of the fire and life safety inspections program 
resides.  
Experts warn that the traditionally compartmentalized approach to collection and 
analysis is unequal to the task of dealing with dynamic terrorists threats because timely 
warning is fundamentally incompatible with bureaucratic delay (Markle Foundation, 
2002, p. 69).  EFOs cannot afford to discount national intelligence estimates that rate 
terrorist groups a serious threat to the homeland (National Intelligence Council, 2007, p. 
6).  This analysis validates the need for a working framework and mechanism to gather 
and share information to and from firefighters that is “timely, tailored, digestible and 
clear” (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 139).  
The benefits of a CIMS tool are multifaceted when integrated into daily use for a 
fire inspection program and pre-fire applications that serve to share intelligence with all 
homeland security partners.  As history has revealed, lack of imagination and maintaining 
status quo can have catastrophic results.   
F. THE BRITISH MODEL 
Several international countries with counterterrorism strategies incorporate multi-
agency coordination, but none had codified formal relationships that included its fire 
service or brigade as well as the British model known as CONTEST. While noted earlier 
in this thesis, effective information sharing is a critical element toward the integration of 
intelligence functions in the American fire service; one means to achieve this type of 
collaboration is from strong partnerships founded by a culture that fosters situational 
awareness by all members of government.  
What can be gleaned from the British model is how fire brigades are integrated 
into the UKs terrorism preparedness and prevention strategy and what mechanisms exist 
to develop a cohesive relationship among multi-disciplinary and multi-agency partners in 
                                                 
32 Fire Prevention Division of the Seattle Fire Department, commonly referred to as the Fire Marshal’s 
Office, provides the guidance and inspection services to help prevent fires and assure fire and life safety for 
people who live, work and visit in Seattle. 
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response to the terrorism activity since 9/11.  Moreover, what is nonexistent in the US 
fire service is the formal structure or platform for information sharing necessary for 
collaboration and coordination prior to an incident.  Subsequently, there are unrealistic 
expectations that by adopting the Incident Command System, all of these issues will fall 
into place and take care of themselves.  
In the U.S, mutual aid among neighboring jurisdictions is codified in formal 
agreements and gives every department a source of emergency staffing when the 
demands of a major incident exceed that department's in-house capacity.  Personal 
relationships or history cement bonds rooted in collaborations that extend from 
department leaders and shared experiences that form part of the unique character and 
culture of a given fire house.  These relationships may trace to shared victories and losses 
during a major response where the firefighters responded as the result of a mutual aid 
request.  They may also trace to EFOs who started out as firefighters in the same 
department but eventually went on to lead different agencies yet in a similar style with 
frequent interactions that dispose their staffs to work well together.   
While grant funding may theoretically create similar opportunities for introducing 
different departments and EFOs, there are diverging opinions about the competitive 
nature of the DHS grant system.  Informed analysts suggest the DHS grant process 
undermines unity of effort across jurisdictional lines, turning potential collaborators into 
competitors for resources (Stockton & Roberts, 2008, p. 7).   
Given that the United States Fire Service consists of a network of fire departments 
that operate independently within their jurisdictions, there are three main incentives for 
one fire department to collaborate with another:  mutual aid, personal relationships or 
history, and grant funding. 
By contrast, fire service symposium and planning forums that abound in Britain 
are absent from the US response community.  The British combine formal doctrine with 
government sponsorship of conferences and joint planning sessions that convey an 
official and working-level imprimatur on the intelligence-sharing role.  In Britain, fire  
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service intelligence seems important because the emphasis begins at the top but finds 
widespread reinforcement at the working level that radiates back upward out of local 
response communities.    
For meaningful change to produce tangible dividends in U.S. fire service 
intelligence, EFOs must take on systemic issues that will otherwise undermine the 
desired paradigm shift.  The first bomb to sweep out of this potential minefield is the lack 
of a basic understanding of each partner agency's mission, priorities, assets, and needs 
(Royal et al., 2008, p. 20).  By operating in a relative vacuum in such areas, intelligence 
partners miss opportunities to assist each other and, by extension, do so at the expense of 
their own communities.  Stovepipe cultures also reduce the value of endeavors that 
require partner and stakeholders participation prior to a terrorist incident: joint training, 
advance resource allocation and procurement planning, or formal policies to streamline 
intelligence sharing.  On the other hand as described in the UK Resiliency Policy below, 
British counterparts go to great lengths to meet in advance to bring such matters to light 
before the exigencies of crisis force collaboration under fire. 
1. British Resiliency Policies 
The United Kingdom has a long history of dealing with terrorist activity, with 
attacks associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its affiliates dominating 
most of the twentieth century.  In the face of post-9/11 attacks attributed to Islamist 
terrorism, both the U.S. and Britain have responded by addressing gaps in domestic 
security policies with mixed results.  The U.S. established the Department of Homeland 
Security to combine 22 federal agencies that employ over 180,000 people (Cornish, 2007, 
p. 10).  Britain created an international counter terrorism strategy, CONTEST. This 
strategy is a collaborative effort that includes stakeholders across governmental 
departments, emergency services, voluntary organizations, business sector and 
international partners. 
As noted, the British approach “treats terrorism as one of a number of causes of 
emergency, which should be planned for and managed using variable architecture of 
cooperation between central/regional and local government, and between competent 
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agencies” (Cornish, 2007, p. 10).  Moreover, the British counter-terrorism strategy 
highlights reducing terrorist risk as a way to free citizens to go about their daily lives 
(United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009).  By using four inter-linked 
strands, the intent is that CONTEST will contribute to reducing that risk.  The four 
principal strands are: 
• Prevent terrorism by tackling the underlying causes of radicalization in 
the UK and abroad, and by engaging in a battle of ideas against those who 
project an extremist ideology; 
• Pursue terrorists and those that sponsor them by gathering intelligence 
and disrupting terrorist activity, and by working with allies and partners 
internationally; 
• Protect the public and UK interests by strengthening border security, 
improving security of key utilities, and by protecting the public in 
crowded places; and 
• Prepare for the consequences of a terrorist attack by developing the 
necessary means with which to respond to an attack, and by a process of 
testing and evaluating national preparedness. (Cornish, 2007, p. 9)33 
While the Prevent and Pursue strands are considered pre-emptive measures, 
Protect and Prepare were notably beneficial to London’s response and recovery 
immediately after the July 2005 bombings (Wheeler, 2005, p. 9).  Under the Prepare 
strand there are two important concepts—Civil Contingency and Resilience—that 
exemplify organizational infrastructure and cooperation that are missing from the US 
U.S. model. 
Experts suggest that effectively dealing with the strategic threat of terrorism 
requires “a policy and operational response [that] acknowledges the complexity and 
interconnectedness of the contemporary strategic threat which can adapt and evolve as 
circumstances change” (Cornish, 2007, p. 5).  Furthermore, Britain amended its policy to 
reflect this strategy by recognizing the importance of its local agencies and reflecting that 
acknowledgement with transformative language in its domestic security policy and 
                                                 
33 For complete description of CONTEST see 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34898). 
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planning.  Consequently, “civil defense” is now “civil contingencies” and “resilience.” 34  
According a to report published in 2007, the new terminology bodes well toward a multi-
level efficient combination of a “top-down” and “bottom-up” approach that distributes 
the responsibility for risk management and emergency responses within the national 
counter-terrorism response (Cornish, 2007, p. 5).   
The legislation that delineated the framework was the Civil Contingencies Act35 
of 2004.  The value of this legislation was in expediting future passage of emergency 
laws and incorporating local and regional partnerships into the responsibility of 
emergency services (Cornish, 2007, p. 10).  The Act’s focus is on adverse consequences 
whether from acts of terrorism, natural disaster, or major accident.  
The British organizational structure for responding to civil emergencies relies on 
two principles.  First, the response begins at the local level, with additional resources 
flowing in from regional followed by national levels.  Second, each disaster has one lead 
department to coordinate the overall government response, with the national emergency 
machinery assigned a supportive role only as necessary (Cornish, 2007, p. 11).   
By contrast, in the U.S. the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
plays a greater role in the mid-term response and in most of the disaster recovery.  
Consequently, the U.S. theater of operations invites more confusion and conflict in those 
circumstances when a local government agency in the lead finds that a federal agency is 
responding to the same incident at the same time.  Every incident is unique, and there are 
instances when collaboration may impede response by imposing delay.  However, as 
decision making and task interdependencies increase in complexity, effective 
collaboration becomes extremely critical (Hocevar, Thomas, & Jansen, 2006, p. 257).  
The Act is divided into two parts: Part I defines roles and responsibilities for local 
authorities involved in emergency preparation and response. There are two categories of 
responders, both with separate and distinct sets of duties.   
                                                 
34 For this thesis, resilience is defined as “the ability to manage disruptive challenges, such as terrorist 
attacks, chemical biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incidents or major flooding that can lead to or 
result in crisis” (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005). 
35 The Civil Contingences Act hereafter referred to as the Act. 
 78
Category I responders are the primary actors at the core of the response to an 
emergency and are subject to a full set of civil protection duties that requires they 
implement or undertake certain tasks during emergencies: 
• Assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform 
contingency planning; 
• Put in place emergency plans; 
• Put in place business continuity management arrangements; 
• Make information available to the public about civil protection matters,  
• Maintain arrangements to warn, inform, and advise the public  in the event 
of an emergency; 
• Share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination; 
• Co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and 
efficiency; 
• Provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organizations 
about business continuity management. (Cornish, 2007, p. 13) 
Category II responders are “cooperating bodies” that are generally non-
emergency services partners.  Outside of emergencies directly affecting their sector, 
Category II organizations are rarely involved in the planning aspect.  Their range of 
duties is minimal compared to Category I responders however, they are also required to 
co-operate and share relevant information with other Category I and II responders.   
An important aspect of the Act requires that fire and rescue authorities work in 
co-operation with all first responders, local authorities and other emergency services.  
The modality for sharing information comes from the formation of Local Resilience 
Forums (LRFs) and through Regional Management Boards.  These required working 
relationships offer the greatest capacity for coordination and cooperation among 
responders at the local level while concurrently meeting the intent of statutory obligations 
under Part 1 of the Act. 
London has six such collaborative forums tasked with the identifying and 
assessing local risks to anticipate a significant emergency.  Forum participants assess 
risks a score based on their likelihood of occurrence.  Then they log the scores in a 
publicly available Community Risk Register (CRR).  Participation in this process 
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includes “representatives from the emergency services, local authorities, government 
agencies, health, utilities, voluntary organizations, business and the military (London Fire 
Brigade, 2009).”  
To support collaboration and continuity in the UK, each Category I agency 
identifies an emergency planning officer.  The officer’s responsibilities are to ensure their 
agency complies with the Act and serves as the liaison with other agencies.  In this 
capacity, the emergency planning officer is responsible for coordinating and sharing 
relevant information with other responders.  Additionally, these officers ensure there is a 
coordinated response to terrorist attacks and, more importantly, they sustain formal 
relationships with both law enforcement and the fire service.  The Home Office 
collaborates with the Association of Chief Police Officers, while the fire service works 
under the Department for Communities and Local Government.   
Another British example of multi-disciplinary collaboration is the Tacticians’ 
Forum established in 2004 as a conduit for first responders to compare notes and develop 
planning and response solutions.  Nationally, the multi-agency groups that participate in 
the forum are recognized as the leaders empowered to resolve emergent response 
coordination challenges for incidents involving chemical, biological, radiation or nuclear 
(CBRN) weapons.   
This forum includes members from a broad spectrum of disciplines and 
organizations that are primarily from the emergency services and central government 
agencies.  Forum participants develop planning and response tactics as well as guidance 
for emergency workers across the country.  When necessary, the forum serves as an 
intermediary between policy units and frontline responders.  Its primary purpose is to 
facilitate communication across the emergency services while emphasizing joint 
objectives, terminology, and training.  What the forum is not responsible for is the 
development and implementation of policy related CBRN strategy (United Kingdom, 
2009). 
While the London Fire Brigade (LFB) participates in all of the Local Resilience 
Forums and any of the Regional Resilience Forums deemed appropriate, LFB views the 
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Act as more of an organizational framework than a new burden for the Fire and Rescue 
Authorities (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005, p. 29).  Hence, the Regional 
Resilience Forums work to elevate the coordination of planning and enhance 
communications between the center and the region; and between the region and local 
responders.   
Lastly, a significant attribute of the British approach to emergency response is its 
nationally accepted framework for managing the local multi-agency response and 
recovery. This process engages a collaborative pool of experts and avoids the need for 
erecting a huge new bureaucracy to organize the response, while maintaining a clear 
chain of command.  Three management tiers comprise the framework, Bronze, Silver, 
and Gold, thereby reducing confusion of roles and responsibilities.  Based on formal 
relationships reinforced through forums, agencies become well versed in stakeholder 
missions, the statutory requirement to share information, and the identification of 
associated risks.  
2. U.S. Policy Implications 
The 9/11 Commission asserts the need to transform the organization of 
government in a new way that achieves a unity of effort and delivers on the claim that 
“Good people can overcome bad structures. They should not have to” (2004, p. 399).  
Nevertheless, four years later, homeland security observers noted that barriers to unity of 
effort remained a challenge and in need of “...coordination and cooperation by the 
disparate partners in homeland security to accomplish mutually agreed objectives” 
(Stockton & Roberts, 2008, p. 1). Furthermore, the panel of experts articulated the 
difficulty of building unity of effort across jurisdictional boundaries. “Effective unity of 
effort will only emerge when the stakeholders in homeland security—federal, state, local, 
and private sector—help formulate the goals that the stakeholders will jointly pursue and 
reach consensus on the means to achieve them” (Stockton & Roberts, 2008, p. 2). 
A contributing factor is that there are numerous national homeland security 
guidance documents and strategies on planning, responding, and recovery, but none 
addressing coordination and cooperation.  Only recently, has there been effort 
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specifically geared toward information/intelligence sharing, and few of these are directed 
toward the fire service. Moreover, these modern policies and frameworks for managing 
emergency responses primarily focus at the federal level. Some examples of the most 
prominent ones addressing emergency response protocols include the National Response 
Framework; the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident 
Command System (ICS); the National Preparedness Goal; and the Target Capabilities 
List.  
The sheer volume and magnitude of these documents leaves state and local 
agencies awash in a sea of marginally relevant federal guides or unfunded mandates.  At 
the same time as they are inundated with these materials, local agencies find themselves 
facing extraordinary challenges to meet minimum standards with aging infrastructure yet 
without funding to meet these mandates.  Regardless, federal policy makers continue to 
create or amend polices after every real or perceived failure in a major emergency 
response.  Although after-action reports and the accompanying lessons learned can be 
invaluable for future planning, most of the time the new capabilities may not be 
appropriate in every jurisdiction and certainly not nationally. The caveat being that these 
documents are produced and available for review in a timely manner.  Experiences of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are examples where gaps in preparedness and regional 
responses may have applicability however; hurricanes are not a threat in most parts of the 
country. Although most first responders agree with this sentiment, this issue remains a 
major concern and a source of frustration among state and local authorities (Royal et al., 
2008, pp.19–20).    
To clarify and prioritize objectives, one may ultimately turn to the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, issued first in 2002 and updated in 2007.  This strategy 
focuses on four goals: 
• Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks;  
• Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources;  
• Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur; and  
• Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success. 
(U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 1) 
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While the strategy contends that it is a living document meant to evolve with the 
current trends and threats, its most recent version was largely reactive to failures in the 
response to Hurricane Katrina.  Where it falls short is it recognizes the importance of 
planning, collaboration, and information sharing, but it does not identify a formal 
machinery to accomplish this.  The inference is that policies to deal with such issues will 
be addressed by states, and local governments through their public safety leaders. 
At the federal level, the National Response Framework (NRF) is a guide to how 
the nation conducts all-hazards response.  The plan delineates that “it is built upon 
scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and 
responsibilities across the Nation” (DHS, 2008, p. 1).  The framework describes roles and 
responsibilities that incorporate emergency service function annexes.  Additionally, there 
are five principles that define actions in support of the nation’s response mission. Taken 
together, these five principles constitute the national response doctrine.  
Those five key principles are: 
• Engaged partnership 
• Tiered response 
• Scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities 
• Unity of effort through unified command 
• Readiness to act. (DHS, 2008, p. 8) 
The National Response Framework “is rooted in America’s federal system and 
the Constitution’s division of responsibilities between federal and state governments” 
(DHS, 2008, p. 8).  This separation stands in contrast to the inclusive collaboration of 
Britain’s strategy. However, during natural or induced disasters, significant hurdles arise 
when the political environment makes it unclear who is in charge or which agency is 
responsible for what task.  In partial recognition of this dilemma, the U.S. developed the 
National Incident Management System as a step on the path to standardized command 
structures for emergency response.   
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Where Britain incorporates emergency response into its counter-terrorism 
strategy, the U.S. differentiates between the two.  Having separate and sometimes 
competing objectives adds to the state of uncertainty that inhibits interagency 
collaboration.   
The fire service should be a central player in developing all-source situational 
awareness rather than taking a sideline approach. With law enforcement centric strategies 
in the United States, what has developed is a fractured infrastructure to share intelligence.  
Britain has implemented a functional model utilizing resiliency forums at each level of 
government.  The British have also formalized collaboration and statutory relationships 
that support intelligence sharing in ways that could inform future U.S. strategy.  If the fire 
service created corresponding forums and similarly engaged its critical partners, the 
resulting creation of shared knowledge would enhance inter-agency collaboration. In 
theory, by establishing resiliency forums at the local and regional levels, the U.S. would 
begin to overcome systemic barriers to information sharing.  
Clarification of local responsibilities would also benefit from adopting the British 
method of categorizing partners as Category I and Category II responders.  This 
categorization would reduce the uncertainties that persist regarding authority to share 
intelligence and the integration of non-traditional agencies into the intelligence-sharing 
project.   
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VI. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
As a framework to shed light on the complexity of transforming a culture founded 
on over 200 years of tradition, the research methodology best suited for this subject 
matter was a multifaceted approach.  Given the research questions were directed at EFOs, 
it was imperative to examine the leadership of the fire service in the context of existing 
theories and national guidance supporting the homeland security mission to deter, detect 
and prevent terrorism.  
In a concerted effort to answer the following questions, the research began with a 
literature review that encompassed complexity theory, leadership, and relevant national 
strategies related to homeland security and intelligence sharing.  
How can the fire service transform its current paradigm to one best suited to the 
demands of emerging homeland security issues related to intelligence and information 
sharing? 
What barriers are impeding the adoption of intelligence functions? 
Following a comprehensive literature review, the research dictated that the fire 
service’s introduction into the intelligence arena remains a work in progress with limited 
published analysis on its trials and evolution. Hence, employing the Delphi method to 
survey a targeted group of independent experts in the fire service provides insight to 
inform this area of study.   
Given that the machinery of intelligence is more commonly associated with the 
law enforcement community, the research strategy aimed at consulting the limited group 
of EFOs and firefighters with practical intelligence to capture their diverse perspectives 
in this emerging field.  Accordingly, the researcher began to identify viable candidates to 
serve as subject matter experts (SMEs) within the limited fire-service intelligence 
community.  The research group was originally selected from the fifteen fire departments 




workgroup. By participating in the 2009 National Fusion Center Conference in Kansas 
City, the researcher discovered additional EFOs who were both willing and able to 
contribute to this body of research. 
The SMEs were selected because they have extensive practical experience in 
local, state, or regional collaborative efforts dealing with intelligence sharing in a multi-
disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional environment.  Eight experts work in their 
departments Homeland Security Division and collaborate with multi-disciplinary 
agencies.  Seven are liaisons to the local Joint Terrorism Task Force, while three serve as 
Terrorism Liaison Officers. Five experts are fire service executives who promote 
intelligence functions and fulfill roles addressing strategic initiatives to support terrorism 
prevention within their respective fire departments and local jurisdictions.  Lastly, three 
of the SMEs included alumni from the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security who have previously explored aspects of the fire service role within 
the fusion process, the FSIE, and the general homeland security enterprise. 
Results from the surveys also identified three additional SMEs who maintained 
positions advancing intelligence initiatives within the fire service. With this new 
information, the second phase of the research included personal interviews with three 
additional fire service intelligence ambassadors.  One of the SMEs served as the 
Terrorism and Homeland Security Chair for the International Association of Fire Chiefs 
and participated on the advisory committee for the Interagency Threat Assessment & 
Coordination Group (ITACG).  Another served as chair of the Fire Service Intelligence 
Enterprise Workgroup and co-chaired the National Capital Region Fire Chief Intelligence 
working group.   While the third is the first firefighter detailed to the ITACG assigned to 
the National Counterterrorism Center (ITACG) and is from a major urban fire 
department. 
A. QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS 
Beginning with the hypothesis that the fire service needs intelligence to enhance 
public safety and situational awareness but lacks the wherewithal to migrate from first 
responder to first preventer, the initial round of questions focused on what it would take 
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to see movement along this migration path.  Specifically, the first research questionnaire 
asked about strategic initiatives that could collectively support an emerging mission of 
fire service intelligence and information sharing.  Other questions were derived from the 
premise that homeland security initiatives geared toward the emerging threats of 
terrorism are in conflict with operational readiness.  Lastly, the SMEs were asked to 
address innovation as it pertains to the relationship to situational awareness and systemic 
barriers to the first preventer mission. 
The second round of questions focused on issues related to the infrastructure 
necessary to support the federal-led initiative to create fusion centers as a means to bridge 
the intelligence sharing disconnects between local and federal law enforcement 
communities.  Given that fusion centers across the country have varying missions, the 
intent of the questionnaire was to uncover how fire service participation contributes to 
terrorism awareness, identify fire service-specific intelligence and whether situational 
awareness is enhanced by it.  Final questions were geared toward the policy implications 
of engaging in an expanded role that addresses the areas of training, operating policies 
and procedures and the criticality of collaboration with LE. 
The final round of questions intended to uncover critical issues EFOs need to 
resolve if they are to enhance their intelligence cognition. Additional questions related to 
security clearances and the utility of technology were to elicit responses that would 
support or dispute artificial barriers of access to LE-sensitive intelligence.  As a means to 
gauge perceptions of community involvement in terrorism awareness, the SMEs were 
asked to identify campaigns that included the fire service as an active participant in 
suspicious activity reporting and whether their departments had policies that addressed 
civil liberties. In conclusion, the survey addressed forecasting the fire service's 
involvement in an expanded homeland security enterprise that supports the adoption of 
intelligence functions, strategies and implementation. 
B. COMMON THEMES AND KEY FINDINGS 
With each round, responses illustrated systemic barriers that underscored the 
importance of intelligence for the fire service but also the profound resistance to 
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expanding the fire services roles and responsibilities to meet its mission. Further, the 
survey responses illuminated several inductive categories that evolved into common 
themes that would serve as a footprint to edify transformation within the fire service.  
While these themes suggest systemic undertones exist uniformly, the larger implication is 
that a successful framework for transforming the fire service from its first responder 
posture toward a first preventer one will hinge on how well such a framework addresses 
these themes:  
• Fire service culture,   
• Contentious influences 
• Intergroup dynamics 
• Multi-disciplinary collaboration 
Given that fire service culture was a dominant theme among the experts, 
delineating the principles that influence culture are key to an expanded first preventer 
mission.  Although they all acknowledged the intelligence functions are predominantly 
associated with law enforcement, their fire service partners are also critical to this new 
expanded mission.  As one expert noted, “We have to balance the fire service core 
mission with requirements against effective participation, which contributes to the larger 
issue of the homeland security enterprise.” 
The SMEs recognized that EFOs face leadership challenges within the fire service 
that extend from the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) down through the 
International Association of Firefighters (IAFF).  As one chief commented, “The IAFC 
needs to show strong leadership with the nexus of understanding LE. That hasn’t 
happened.” While this shortfall is hardly unique, how it manifests throughout the 
leadership is when this perspective trickles down to state or regional fire chief 
associations. To that end, the participants noted that full participation in the intelligence 
and information sharing enterprise begins locally and expands out to neighboring 
municipalities.  Without a concerted effort from this body of leaders support remains 
elusive and is isolated to major urban fire departments, thus exercising no influence on 
the regions adjacent to these cities.  
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Nevertheless, the core body of professional firefighters (IAFF) has its own 
hierarchy of leadership indifferent or antagonistic to intelligence initiatives.  Nor has 
there been an overwhelming demand for dialogue, prompting one SME to observe, 
“When the IAFF speaks out against this [incorporating intelligence functions], it makes it 
difficult to move forward.” 
Furthermore, the SMEs acknowledged EFOs struggle with strategic and policy 
implications related to intelligence initiatives across the country, because they lack a 
framework for intelligence integration.  One suggested, “EFOs should have a mechanism 
for intelligence.” Another noted the importance of civil liberties. “Policy implications 
include developing training and procedures that assure privacy protections as well as 
required and optional reporting,” While others suggested that EFO should not let the 
enormity of this issue paralyze advancement in this uncharted territory, because 
“intelligence is an adjunct to policy.” 
To further intelligence inculcation, several SMEs suggested that only after 
intelligence needs are identified are EFOs better positioned to make more accurate 
policies that support strategic initiatives.  Although there are many, the experts articulated 
that the key policy implications critical to daily operations are training, personnel, 
protective equipment, staffing levels, and memoranda of understanding with partner 
agencies.  Additionally the SMEs asserted that departments can also use intelligence in 
developing fire prevention inspection cycles or exchanging pre-fire plans with critical 
infrastructure units.  
Given that decision makers have the daunting task of potentially expanding a 200-
year-old mission, one SME suggested that “we have to question…the effectiveness of the 
fire service’s core mission.”  Moreover, many SMEs postulated the priority of protecting 
the community begins with active participation in intelligence sharing, but citizens do not 
understand how terrorism awareness or suspicious activity reporting will complement this 
mission.  One noted, “We have to trust what the community’s needs are as we have an 
obligation to the community that may suffer from risks identified if the risk represents a 
threat to a building or greater risk.”  
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Further, most SMEs noted the necessity of local government support as they 
pursue this expanded mission that includes suspicious activity reporting. SMEs also 
acknowledged the connection to the political life expectancy of elected leaders whose 
prospects are clearly enhanced if the community believes their public safety needs are 
being met. Complicating matters is the premise that fire chiefs generally occupy 
appointed positions which unintentionally put them in conflict if thrust into politically 
charged activities that will enhance operational readiness while risking negative 
publicity.  
One of the most prevalent theories concerning systemic barriers to intelligence is 
the critical metric of intelligence cognition throughout the fire service. Intelligence 
cognition, within this body of research, describes the knowledge, awareness, perception 
and judgment of intelligence functions as they relate to the fire service.  Most SMEs 
suggested that EFOs collectively share a negative perception of the value of intelligence 
because they lack a basic understanding. As one SME stated, “The fire service itself 
doesn’t understand these issues and therefore is unable to relate them—or sell them—to 
the intel [intelligence] community. Potentially, this is a large gap—there are few people 
better positioned to understand a communities risk than the fire service.”   
Likewise, several SME indicated large bodies of EFOs believe intelligence falls 
outside the tradition and scope of the fire service because it is solely the function of the 
law enforcement. One SME noted, “This shortsighted vision is probably one of the 
biggest barriers that exist today.”  Others compared the relationship to operational 
readiness and safety when intelligence and information sharing occurs.  This can be in the 
form of preplanning for critical infrastructure or for terrorism awareness during their 
daily tours.  
Moreover, there is a clear relationship between the positive value ascribed to 
intelligence and success in combating negative perceptions of enhanced operational 
readiness.  As one SME asserted, “Through integration and use of intelligence in 
everyday executive planning functions, an understanding of what intelligence has to offer 
the fires service can be developed.”  This philosophy was endorsed by all of the SMEs as 
a means to overcome the misconceptions of intelligence as it applies to the fire service. 
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Without this momentum, intelligence functions will elude the fire service and the culture 
will inevitably remain stagnant. While change and innovation can begin at every level of 
the fire service, the utility of intelligence must be embraced by EFOs if intelligence is to 
become a viable mission.  
Within the fire service, EFOs and firefighters alike tend to rely on peer experience 
as a gauge of the viability of new theories or advancements in technology. The SMEs 
affirmed that EFOs need formal education and exposure to the benefits of intelligence 
which should be based on fire service practitioners demonstrated utility. The SMEs 
asserted that once EFOs are well versed and comfortable with intelligence, EFOs will 
find the best method to incorporate terrorism awareness or suspicious activity reporting 
functions within their departments.   
To accomplish this indoctrination, it is imperative that every level be included for 
effective implementation.  In that regard, the SMEs overwhelming affirmed that EFOs 
are the key to the ultimate transformation of the fire service. One SME opined, “We are 
working on changing the cultural firefighter mindset. To do this the firefighters need to 
understand how they fit into the larger picture.”  Furthermore, another SME articulated 
the critical role of EFOs as catalyst for change when he stated, “Agency heads drive the 
message down through an organization so that the line-level understand their roles” 
Contentious influences encompass external demands common with homeland 
security initiatives that originate at the federal level. While competing missions are 
hardly unique to the fire service, when federal expectations become the sole driving force 
for intelligence sharing initiatives, they compete with local priorities.  Specifically, if a 
state or local law enforcement office requests a firefighter for assignment to a task force 
or fusion center to assist with rescue or haz/mat planning, then that firefighter’s 
department must be willing to redistribute the assigned firefighter’s duties through 
backfilling or if possible, among co-workers who may already be overextended.  Absent 
a demonstrable, near-term benefit for the fire department and even the assigned 
firefighter, supporting this resource drain becomes an undue burden and uphill battle.  As 
the experts further articulated, few departments are incentivized to participate, yet many  
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are thrust into an interagency arena where available grant funding to offset the costs of 
such resources is routinely channeled to law enforcement partners, leaving zero dollars 
earmarked or available for the fire service.   
The SMEs identified the foregoing situation as one with significant potential to 
undermine fire service advancement in the intelligence sharing enterprise.  Presented with 
intelligence as yet another unsustainable mandate, EFOs are forced to choose between 
staffing funded positions and removing essential staff from core duties to support 
FLO/TLO posts associated with intelligence duties. One SME asserted that, given that 
today’s fire service has become an all-hazard responder, these initiatives are “intended to 
improve services, protection, detection, etc. [However] minimal, if any, funding for 
locals is included.  Thus, the mandate is rendered ineffective.” 
According to the SMEs, one of the most emotional arguments against intelligence 
functions in the fire service is their potential for damaging public trust by making snoops 
out of heroes.  It derives from the apprehension that firefighters would trample on civil 
liberties and compromise private information at the expense of the positive relationship 
enjoyed by fire departments across the country.  Acknowledging the importance of public 
perception, the SMEs nonetheless agreed that if intelligence cognition were to improve, 
this common concern could be properly addressed with public safety in mind.  As one 
SME said, “We need discussion with both groups—ACLU and citizens… [in order] to 
educate the public and the ACLU.”  The extra time necessary to build intelligence 
capability slowly by explaining public safety objectives and community benefits is worth 
the effort.  Moving slowly with public transparency to build this capacity while 
preserving community trust would alleviate concerns of both firefighters and the 
communities they serve.  
The benefit to this strategy is that it would enlighten the community while 
exposing as unfounded claims that firefighters become spies when gathering intelligence. 
As several SMEs suggested, finding the balance between enhancing situational awareness 
and supporting the larger homeland security enterprise “requires two-dimensional 
thinking.”  This thinking recognizes the value of intelligence and forces EFO to adjust 
their current paradigm by thinking of the bigger picture.  
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Intergroup dynamics concerns adversarial relationship between law enforcement 
and the fire service.  As previously suggested, the SMEs concluded that critical hurdles 
preventing intelligence sharing between the two public safety agencies is rooted in a lack 
of understanding. This misunderstanding encompasses intelligence needs, fire service 
contributions to the intelligence cycle, and general mistrust. 
While the law enforcement community continues to control most terrorism 
intelligence and, by extension, related grant funding for this mission, homeland security 
leaders have been slow to admit that law enforcement’s intelligence needs do not 
resemble those of the fire service. SMEs variously claimed fire service needs terrorist 
“tactics, techniques and procedures,” or “trends, tactics and procedures,” or even “threats, 
tactics and procedures.” Trends could easily encompass both techniques and threats, as 
both provide information that will support situational awareness and strategic initiatives 
on training, resource allocations, and gap analysis.  Most agree that the fire service 
should be concerned with tactics, imminent targets, threats and timely notice of attacks if 
the fire service is to contribute to the larger homeland security mission of protecting the 
public. 
Unfortunately, most of the SMEs acknowledged that, post 9/11, local law 
enforcement agencies have made advances in intelligence-led policing but have neglected 
to include the fire service.  As a result, law enforcement is more inclined to see terrorist 
intelligence as its exclusive preserve made easier to restrict through law enforcement 
control of security clearances for intelligence access. One SME claim is that security 
clearances restrictions prevent the flow of intelligence between the two partners. 
However this claim invites skepticism, as almost all of the SMEs either possessed 
security clearances or had members in their department with security clearances.  
Moreover, there were several SMEs who contended that LE ability to control “who” gets 
a security clearance, coupled with the vast inconsistencies between intelligence agencies, 
has caused severe tension in some parts of the country.  
What became apparent was that having clearances does not automatically mean 
fire service inclusion in information/intelligence sharing. As one SME stated, 
“Clearances do not define relevance” Likewise, most agreed that intelligence is often 
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over classified when the relevant information could be sanitized of one or two sensitive 
details in order to reach a broader community of both firefighters and police officers. 
Through this broader distribution, law enforcement partners will be exposed to the 
benefits of fire service expertise while establishing a mutually beneficial relationship.  As 
one SME explained, “Once the relationship is established, it will give the officers the 
ability to get properly vetted official information to their troops, thus increasing 
situational awareness.” 
Despite the abundance of federally led intelligence initiatives, the SMEs saw that 
tenuous relationships between LE and fire prevail in some parts of the country.  Further, 
they strongly asserted that the fire service has a legitimate right to intelligence when there 
is the potential for harm to firefighters or an adverse impact to their ability to protect the 
public.  When EFOs understand that they have a responsibility to expose this deficiency, 
they will be in a better position to demand a seat at the intelligence table. 
Multidisciplinary collaboration speaks to efforts that bridge infrastructure with 
capabilities and capacity for intelligence sharing. As articulated by the Delphi SMEs, a 
plausible measure to meet this gap is to conduct cross-training in terrorism awareness 
while considering the efficacy to create collaborative partnerships with law enforcement 
to address the development and implementation efforts.  Another is the perceived value 
of fusion center participation coupled with the use of emerging information sharing 
technology to support situational awareness. 
All SMEs agreed that if the fire service intends to expand its current mission, the 
educational process has to begin with EFOs.  They need instruction on the intricacies and 
methods of terrorism awareness, the intelligence cycle, suspicious activity reporting and 
exposure to other fire departments that have successfully collaborated with local and state 
law enforcement partners.   
Another means to accomplish training and exposure is via the DHS sponsored 
TLO/FLO program; however, this type of training is generally independent of local 
collaboration.  While not all of the SMEs participate in fusion centers, they all agreed that 
participation is beneficial if available.  Where they disagreed was in appropriate levels of 
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participation.  Some suggested that virtually participating and getting together on an ad 
hoc basis was sufficient for most departments. Others observed that participation was 
critical and should be a priority for EFOs when making resource allocations. One SME 
postulated, “In the long run, these relationships enhance inter-agency strategic planning 
and grant capture strategies.”  While an SME who is actively engaged in TLO programs, 
went a step further when he suggested that firefighters in TLO or FLO positions are 
essential to the homeland security mission because they bring their unique lens to the 
integration of information across disciplines. While there are few models of successful 
integrations of TLO/FLO programs, the consensus was that these programs will become 
much more prevalent when funding sources are identified to sustain these investments.  
Most of the SME acknowledged that their departments had limited or non-
existing policies for addressing terrorism awareness and intelligence training.  Despite 
this inconsistency, they universally agreed that any training should follow a thorough 
review of existing department polices and even the creation of new ones.  Additionally, to 
build this new capability, all policies should be vetted with critical stakeholders prior to 
implementation.  
As a means of enhancing collaboration, the SMEs addressed homeland security 
technology as a tool to support the exchange intelligence. The utility of technology was 
supported by the fact that all but one of the SMEs uses technology in some way to 
manage emergency information. Interestingly, the SMEs demonstrated variable degrees 
of implementation and conversance with a broad array of applications, from secured to 
non-secured. Some were fully integrated into extensive networks such as Law 
Enforcement Online (LEO), Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN), Secret Internet 
Protocol Router Network (SiPRNET), and Microsoft SharePoint, while others used 
homegrown networks. While all agreed that technology infusion has its merits, they also 
lamented that few technological advances appear on the horizon if not directly flowing 
from a fusion center or joint terrorism task force.   
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C. SUMMARY 
The SMEs provided insight into several key barriers preventing intelligence 
functions from being implemented into the fire service.  As previously articulated, the 
four critical themes of fire service culture, contentious influences, intergroup dynamics, 
and multi-disciplinary collaboration are at the root of a strategy for transformation. 
Unfortunately, the fire service as a whole has not recognized the value of 
intelligence, nor has it been effective at the collaborative process of information and 
intelligence sharing with LE partners.  Despite the general premise that collaboration 
occurs between law enforcement and non-traditional partners, the research findings 
indicate otherwise.  
What is evident is that there remain collaborative expectations between law 
enforcement and non-traditional partners, yet actual collaborations fall short of 
acceptable levels as the U.S. nears its 10-year anniversary of 9/11.  
Lastly, the SMEs asserted that a large part of this systemic failure falls on the 
shoulders of EFOs and is principally attributed to the overall lack of intelligence 
cognition. When EFOs do not understand intelligence, they can neither define nor 




VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A recurring theme within this body of research has been its role as springboard to 
stimulate interdisciplinary debate about barriers to integrating intelligence into the fire 
service.  Absent such dialogue, fire service migration in the direction of a first preventer 
role appears hopelessly sidelined or destined for oblivion. 
Challenges to intelligence sharing first came to light when the 9/11 Commission 
Report identified the lack of overall situational awareness as a contributing factor for 
uninformed decision-making and an ineffective incident command structure.  
Subsequently, the absence of implementing the Incident Command System (ICS) resulted 
in inconsistent strategic objectives, inefficient coordination of on-scene resources, and the 
inability to communicate intelligence to those who need it most (9/11 Commission, 2004, 
p. 416).  
Through the analysis of national documents, this thesis demonstrated that 
gathering, analyzing and sharing intelligence is paramount for the prevention and 
deterrence of future terrorist acts against the homeland. Moreover, national strategies 
identified that a multi-directional flow of information must include state, local and tribal 
partners to prevent future terrorist attacks, and to counter and respond to threats (White 
House, 2007, p. 3). One in particular, the National Strategy for the Fire Service 
Intelligence Enterprise, specifically targeted the fire service when it delineated that, “fire 
service personnel need ongoing support of intelligence products that include potential or 
actual incident threats so that EFOs can leverage resources toward preparation and 
response capabilities” (DHS, 2008, p. 6). 
The driving force to integrate the fire service into the intelligence arena is rooted 
in national strategic guidance that identifies the fire service is a critical partner in efforts 
to secure the homeland.  Most EFOs widely accept this mandate in the context of their 
traditional core disciplines.  Conversely, a large contingent still resists incorporating 
intelligence functions into the fire service because of widespread doubts expressed by 
front-line firefighters and mid-level fire officers. Some have suggested intelligence 
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functions verge on mission creep36 and that suspicious activity reporting should be 
limited to law enforcement. Clearly, what are underrepresented in this dialogue are the 
few EFOs who can serve as the catalyst to champion the necessary culture shift.  
A. OPERATIONALIZE INTELLIGENCE 
This research provided insight into several barriers preventing the indoctrination 
of intelligence, with four themes emerging as key to a strategy for change. The four 
critical themes were identified as: fire service culture, contentious influences, intergroup 
dynamics, and multi-disciplinary collaboration. 
Despite a sobering call to action on 9/11, EFOs remain challenged to integrate 
into the intelligence network.  As one SME articulated, “The fire service needs a wider 
systems view—as opposed to the singular mission scope. We have a role in homeland 
security which is not mutually exclusive” (ACTC, 2008–2010). 
Clearly, the majority of the fire service has not recognized the value of 
intelligence nor has it been effective at the collaborative process of intelligence sharing 
with their LE partners.  Most alarming is the disconnect between public expectations of 
collaboration between unequivocal fact that there remain collaborative expectations 
between law enforcement and non-traditional partners that remain more aspirational than 
realized at the local and regional levels.  Considering that the U.S. is nearing its ten-year 
anniversary of 9/11, this speaks volumes about the priorities of current grant and program 
directives.  While fusion centers have an abundance of funding streams, it appears that 
none is earmarked for the benefit of the fire service. 
The dynamic tension between the fire service and law enforcement remains a 
complex and sensitive relationship. Admittedly, some of this tension arises primarily 
from overt differences in mission responsibilities and operational objectives (Royal et al., 
2008, p. 15). Unfortunately, this friction gives rise to several fundamental problems that 
undermine the larger mission of intelligence sharing. Before either police or fire can  
 
                                                 
36 The term mission creep can be traced to the military and refers to organizations that expand their 
capabilities causing conflicts with traditional missions of existing agencies (Siegel, 2000, p. 112).  
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transform behaviors, assumptions, and outcomes, both need to recognize that while they 
generally act independently, they must nevertheless co-exist as partners within the 
communities they serve.   
As highlighted by this research, the lack of intelligence cognition by most EFOs is 
considered a fundamental problem across the country.  When EFOs do not understand 
intelligence, they cannot articulate their needs to LE or within their own departments.  
Thus, while few EFOs are talking about intelligence or engaging in interdisciplinary 
debate, there are more who may view the dialogue as noise rather than a critical function 
to support their public safety missions. 
To cultivate leadership in the fire service, a priority should be the creation of a 
professional development program that emphasizes the role of the fire service as part of 
the larger homeland security mission. Without educated leaders, major urban fire 
departments will miscalculate their roles and jeopardize firefighters and the communities 
they serve. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Complacency post 9/11 is a recipe for disaster.  As America witnessed firsthand, 
the rules of engagement changed dramatically that dreadful day.  Experts contend that 
“We must observe what is going on around us and be ever vigilant to guard against 
another tragedy such as the one that occurred on that fateful September morning” (Waite, 
2008, p. 76).  A key to this level of awareness clearly involves operationalizing 
intelligence functions within the fire service. 
As history has revealed, maintaining the status quo with a lack of imagination can 
have catastrophic results.  EFOs who perpetuate this philosophy clearly discount national 
intelligence estimates suggesting terrorist groups continue to exist and remain a serious 
threat (National Intelligence Council, 2007, p. 6).  Given today’s environment, being 
innovative and collaborative are more than philosophical choices, they are mandates for 
the modern fire service’s survival.  
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Intelligence provided to fire departments has been called a force multiplier 
allowing firefighters to focus limited resources on training and readiness for specific 
scenarios (Gartenstein-Ross & Dabruzzi, 2008, p. 4).  More importantly, it is the duty of 
EFOs to pursue an innovative, collaborative strategy founded on a robust goal of adapting 
its own paradigm to changing conditions.  As intelligence functions are woven into the 
fabric of the fire service, future generations will effectively embody the doctrine of 
deterring and preventing terrorist attacks.  
This thesis asserts that, within the fire service, there are schools of thought that 
embrace this strategy as a means to support the mission of protecting their communities 
and their firefighters as a natural extension of duties conducted every day by fire 
departments across the nation.   
Despite the absence of a successful terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11, 
first responders must be cognizant that an attack is inevitable.  Likewise, it is imperative 
that EFOs remain vigilant in their efforts to deal with low probability—high consequence 
events.  While the American citizenry faces periodic reminders of the threat as the 
memory of 9/11 fades and fosters complacency, the fire service must continue to evolve 
if it is to remain vital and effective.  The next step on its evolutionary path is intelligence 
sharing—a necessity for adaptation and survival.   
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APPENDIX—CRITICAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS GUIDLINES 
The software should: 
• Be affordable given the size of a jurisdiction’s budget. 
• Be user friendly. 
• Be easy to maintain by existing EMA staff with access to the vendor’s 
technical support services. 
• Be easy to tailor to the conditions and policies of the agency. 
• Allow for remote access by authorized users located outside the LAN. 
• Comply with the provisions and standards for Incident Command System 
(ICS). ICS is the model tool for command, control, and coordination of a 
response and is built around five major management activities of an 
incident: 
 
¾ Command. ¾ Operations. 
¾ Planning. ¾ Logistics. 
¾ Finance/administration.  
 
• Comply with the provisions of the Emergency Support Functions (ESF). 
ESF consists of 12 main groups that manage and coordinate specific 
categories of assistance common to all disasters.  
• Each ESF group is headed by a lead organization responsible for 
coordinating the delivery of goods and services to the disaster area and is 
supported by numerous other organizations. The ESF annexes are— 
 
¾ Transportation (ESF 1). ¾ Communications (ESF 2). 
¾ Public works and engineering (ESF 3). ¾ Firefighting (ESF 4). 
¾ Information and planning (ESF 5). ¾ Mass care (ESF 6). 
¾ Resource support (ESF 7). ¾ Health and medical services (ESF 8). 
¾ Urban search and rescue (ESF 9). ¾ Hazardous materials (ESF 10). 
¾ Food (ESF 11). ¾ Energy (ESF 12). 
 
• Integrate with other systems, such as mapping, other CIMS, and 
telephonic alert notification systems. 
• Integrate public health into emergency management. 
• Operate within a variety of network configurations. 
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• Have a wide range of features consistent with the four phases of 
emergency management operations: planning, mitigation, response, and 
recovery. 
• Have help desk support available on a 24-hour, 7-days-per-week basis, 
including on-call or availability by cellular phone (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2002, p. 7). 
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